penetration-testing-sample-report-2013.pdf

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Penetration  Test  Report  
MegaCorp  One  
August  10
th
,  2013  
 
 
 
 
Offensive  Security  Services,  LLC
 
19706  One  Norman  Blvd.  
Suite  B  #253  
Cornelius,  NC  28031  
United  States  of  America  
Tel:  
Fax:  
Email:  
Web:  
1-­‐402-­‐608-­‐1337  
1-­‐704-­‐625-­‐3787  
info@offsec.com  
http://www.offensive-­‐security.com
 
 
Table  of  Contents  
 
P
ENETRATION  
T
EST  
R
EPORT  
–
 
M
EGA
C
ORP  
O
NE  
Executive  Summary  
Summary  of  Results  
Attack  Narrative  
Remote  System  Discovery  
Admin  Webserver  Interface  Compromise  
Interactive  Shell  to  Admin  Server  
Administrative  Privilege  Escalation  
Java  Client  Attacks  
Escalation  to  Local  Administrator  
Deep  Packet  Inspection  Bypass  
Citrix  Environment  Compromise  
Escalation  to  Domain  Administrator  
Conclusion  
Recommendations  
Risk  Rating  
Appendix  A:  Vulnerability  Detail  and  Mitigation  
Risk  Rating  Scale  
Default  or  Weak  Credentials  
Password  Reuse  
Shared  Local  Administrator  Password  
Patch  Management  
DNS  Zone  Transfer  
Default  Apache  Files  
Appendix  B:  About  Offensive  Security  
 
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PTR-­‐20130513  
Copyright  ©  2013  Offensive  Security  Services  LLC.  All  rights  reserved.  
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P
ENETRATION  
T
EST  
R
EPORT  
–
 
M
EGA
C
ORP  
O
NE  
Executive  Summary  
Offensive   Security   was   contracted   by   MegaCorp   One   to   conduct   a   penetration   test   in   order   to  
determine  its  exposure  to  a  targeted  attack.  All  activities  were  conducted  in  a  manner  that  simulated  a  
malicious  actor  engaged  in  a  targeted  attack  against  MegaCorp  One  with  the  goals  of:  
o
o
Identifying  if  a  remote  attacker  could  penetrate  MegaCorp  One’s  defenses  
Determining  the  impact  of  a  security  breach  on:  
o
o
Confidentiality  of  the  company’s  private  data  
Internal  infrastructure  and  availability  of  MegaCorp  One’s  information  systems  
Efforts   were   placed   on   the   identification   and   exploitation   of   security   weaknesses   that   could   allow   a  
remote   attacker   to   gain   unauthorized   access   to   organizational   data.   The   attacks   were   conducted   with  
the   level   of   access   that   a   general   Internet   user   would   have.   The   assessment   was   conducted   in  
accordance   with   the   recommendations   outlined   in   NIST   SP   800-­‐115
1
  with   all   tests   and   actions   being  
conducted  under  controlled  conditions.  
 
 
                                                                                                                       
1
 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-­‐115/SP800-­‐115.pdf  
PTR-­‐20130513  
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P
ENETRATION  
T
EST  
R
EPORT  
–
 
M
EGA
C
ORP  
O
NE  
Summary  of  Results  
Initial  reconnaissance  of  the  MegaCorp  One  network  resulted  in  the  discovery  of  a  misconfigured  DNS  
server   that   allowed   a   DNS   zone   transfer.   The   results   provided   us   with   a   listing   of   specific   hosts   to   target  
for   this   assessment.   An   examination   of   these   hosts   revealed   a   password-­‐protected   administrative  
webserver   interface.   After   creating   a   custom   wordlist   using   terms   identified   on   the   MegaCorp   One’s  
website  we  were  able  to  gain  access  to  this  interface  by  uncovering  the  password  via  brute-­‐force.  
An   examination   of   the   administrative   interface   revealed   that   it   was   vulnerable   to   a   remote   code  
injection  vulnerability,  which  was  used  to  obtain  interactive  access  to  the  underlying  operating  system.  
This   initial   compromise   was   escalated   to   administrative   access   due   to   a   lack   of   appropriate   system  
updates  on  the  webserver.  After  a  closer  examination,  we  discovered  that  the  compromised  webserver  
utilizes  a  Java  applet  for  administrative  users.  We  added  a  malicious  payload  to  this  applet,  which  gave  
us  interactive  access  to  workstations  used  by  MegaCorp  One’s  administrators.    
Using   the   compromised   webserver   as   a   pivot   point   along   with   passwords   recovered   from   it,   we   were  
able  to  target   previously   inaccessible  internal  resources.  This  resulted  in   Local   Administrator   access   to  
numerous   internal   Windows   hosts,   complete   compromise   of   a   Citrix   server,   and   full   administrative  
control  of  the  Windows  Active  Directory  infrastructure.  Existing  network  traffic  controls  were  bypassed  
through  encapsulation  of  malicious  traffic  into  allowed  protocols.    
 
 
 
PTR-­‐20130513  
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P
ENETRATION  
T
EST  
R
EPORT  
–
 
M
EGA
C
ORP  
O
NE  
Attack  Narrative  
Remote  System  Discovery  
For   the   purposes   of   this   assessment,   MegaCorp   One   provided   minimal   information   outside   of   the  
organizational   domain   name:   megacorpone.com.   The   intent   was   to   closely   simulate   an   adversary  
without  any  internal  information.  To  avoid  targeting  systems  that  were  not  owned  by  MegaCorp  One,  all  
identified  assets  were  submitted  for  ownership  verification  before  any  attacks  were  conducted.    
In   an   attempt   to   identify   the   potential   attack   surface,   we   examined   the   name   servers   of   the  
megacorpone.com  domain  name  (Figure  1).    
 
Figure  1  –  Information  gathering  for  megacorpone.com  reveals  three  active  name  servers.  
With   the   name   servers   identified,   we   attempted   to   conduct   a   zone   transfer.   We   found   that  
ns2.megacorpone.com  
was   vulnerable   to   a   full   DNS   zone   transfer   misconfiguration.   This   provided   us  
with   a   listing   of   hostnames   and   associated   IP   addresses,   which   could   be   used   to   further   target   the  
organization.   (Figure   2)   Zone   transfers   can   provide   attackers   with   detailed   information   about   the  
capabilities   of   the   organization.   It   can   also   leak   information   about   the   network   ranges   owned   by   the  
organization.  Please  see  Appendix  A  for  more  information.    
 
PTR-­‐20130513  
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