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International Relations Between The Wars

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Oscar Halecki, History of East Central Europe

22 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WARS

EAST CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

It was in the obvious interest of the liberated nations of East Central Europe

that President Wilson’ program of self-determination was combined with a

project of international organization which materialized in the League of

Nations. Such a league, which guaranteed the independence and territorial

integrity of all member states great or small, was welcomed by those countries

which in the past had seen these rights so frequently violated and even

completely refused to them. Furthermore, in the opinion of the peacemakers, the

League was to provide a solution for all those problems which had not been

adequately settled in the various treaties, and such problems were particularly

numerous in East Central Europe, that basically reorganized part of the

continent.

On the other hand, however, the new, restored, or enlarged states of that

region were so concerned with their urgent national issues, at least at the

beginning, that even those of them who were represented at the Peace Conference

and in the drafting of the Covenant could not give sufficient attention to the

general questions which were involved. They also resented the privileged

position of the big powers, first in the Commission which worked out the

organization of the League, and then in the League’ Council. Only one of the

nonpermanent seats could be attributed to the countries of East Central Europe,

Greece being chosen as their first representative, thanks to the prestige of

Venizelos. And Poland’ disappointment at the solution of the Danzig problem did

not make her favorable to the idea of having to share with the League the

limited power given to her in an area which she had hoped to obtain without

restriction.

Poland, too, was the first country which was obliged to sign, simultaneously

with the Versailles Treaty of June 28, 1919, a special treaty with the great

powers whose main provisions dealt with the rights of her minorities, racial,

linguistic, or religious, which were placed under the guaranty of the League.

The resentment caused by that treaty was directed not against the provisions

themselves, since Poland was ready to include even more extensive rights for all

minorities in her national constitution, but against the international

interference with that delicate matter. In the case of Poland, the interference

of her neighbors with the religious minorities problem on the eve of the

partitions was indeed a painful recollection. Though now a similar interference

was entrusted to an international body, the Council of the League, the fact that

this international protection of minorities was not made universal was resented

as a discrimination not only by Poland but also by the other “

new”states,

Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Greece, which had to sign similar

treaties. Among the defeated nations, only the small countries, but not Germany,

also had to accept these obligations regarding minorities in their respective

peace treaties.

The apprehension raised by the system of minorities protection also proved

justified for another reason. Originally that new system was introduced mainly

for assuring protection to the large Jewish minorities in East Central Europe.

When extended to all other groups, however, it was soon used and misused in

favor of the German minorities that were scattered all over that same region.

And it served the German Reich as a weapon for creating trouble in the countries

concerned and for supporting the German groups in their opposition against the

states to which they now belonged. However, that danger became apparent only

after Germany’ admission into the League, which did not take place until after

the admission of all the states of East Central Europe.

In addition to the five of them which as Allied powers were among the

original members of the League, the new Republic of Finland, restored Albania,

and two of the former enemies, Austria and Bulgaria, were admitted by the first

Assembly in December, 1920. On that same occasion all nations which had formerly

been under Russian rule asked for such admission, but their applications were

rejected by a large majority which, except in the case of Finland, did not

consider their situation sufficiently stabilized and which doubted whether or

not the League would be able to safeguard the newly proclaimed independence of

these countries. These apprehensions proved correct with regard to the Ukraine

as well as the distant Transcaucasian republics, but Estonia, Latvia, and

Lithuania were admitted by the second Assembly of the League in September, 1921,

having in the meantime received de jure recognition by all powers. The admission

of Hungary was delayed until the next year because of the unsettled Burgenland

question. All these new members, as far as they had not signed treaties that

included the protection of minorities, had to sign declarations in that matter

(Finland only with respect to the Aland Islands) on the occasion of their

admission, making these international guaranties a general rule in East Central

Europe. Reciprocal guaranties in favor of the minorities on both sides of the

border were included only in the Riga Treaty and in the Geneva Convention

regarding Upper Silesia.

Besides that minorities problem, the countries of East Central Europe had

many other occasions, much more numerous than in the case of any other nations,

to use the machinery of the League. Some of these issues resulted from

territorial controversies connected with the establishment of the new boundaries

but were neither definitely settled nor touched on at all by the Paris Peace

Conference. They were brought before the League’ Council under Article 11 of

the Covenant as threats to international peace. The League was successful in the

question of the Aland Islands and of Upper Silesia, and though the Wilno problem

could not be settled in Geneva, the Council’ action contributed greatly to

avoiding an armed conflict in that matter.

The League also contributed to the settlement of a few minor controversies

regarding the frontiers of Albania and the Polish-Czechoslovak border, and

successfully settled two rather dangerous incidents in the Balkans. Particularly

difficult to deal with was the Greek-Italian dispute in 1923 because one of the

great powers was involved and had already taken military action by bombarding

and occupying the island of Corfu. Though Italy wanted to keep the whole affair

in the hands of the Conference of Ambassadors, the suggestions of the Council of

the League were followed in substance and Corfu was restored to Greece. In 1925

a clash also occurred, this time between Greek and Bulgarian forces, but in that

dispute between two small countries the League was able to act with noteworthy

efficiency and to avoid any serious trouble.

The activity of the so-called technical organizations of the League, which

as a whole was much more successful than its purely political action, proved

particularly helpful to the war-torn countries of East Central Europe.

Immediately after the war, the Health Organization stopped the typhus epidemic

which was spreading westward from Russia, and in the economic and financial

field, in addition to the reconstruction of Austria and Hungary, assistance

through international loans was given to Greece, Bulgaria, Estonia, and to the

Free City of Danzig.

The East Central European countries were, however, most interested in the

League’ efforts to create a system of collective security through mutual

guaranties against aggression which would be more efficient than those provided

for in the Covenant. High hopes were raised at the Assembly of 1924 when the

Geneva Protocol was drafted, giving a clear definition of aggression and

promising joint action against a country that would refuse a peaceful settlement

by arbitration. Edward Benes from Czechoslovakia was very active in preparing

that agreement, and among the other East Central European powers, Poland,

through her foreign minister, Count Alexander Skrzynski, gave special support to

the project.

The protocol was abandoned, however, chiefly because of Britain’

opposition, and the Locarno agreement, which was negotiated the next year

outside the League, proved to be a substitute that was very unsatisfactory to

Germany’ eastern neighbors. Poland was particularly alarmed by the prospect

that Germany, invited to join the League with great power privileges, would have

a permanent seat in the Council. Therefore she claimed a similar privilege for

herself. In 1926, however, she accepted a compromise. This was a so-called

semipermanent seat through the right of re-election. At the same time the number

of nonpermanent seats was increased to eleven so that two more countries from

East Central Europe were always practically certain to be chosen for a period of

three years. And although there were frequent clashes in the Council between the

German and Polish representatives, the new Polish foreign minister, August

Zaleski, was also a strong supporter of the League.

It was the Polish delegation which at the Assembly of 1927 made a proposal

to outlaw war and thus prepared public opinion for the Briand-Kellogg Pact which

was signed in Paris on August 28, 1928, and condemned recourse to war for the

solution of international controversies. And it was that same delegation which

actively participated in the Disarmament Conference of 1932 and submitted a

project of “

moral disarmament”that would make the material limitation and

reduction of armaments easier to accept.

The failure of that Conference and, in general, of the League’ efforts to

combine arbitration, security, and disarmament according to the French formula,

was a special disappointment to the countries of East Central Europe. It was

only then that most of them turned to bilateral agreements with the most

threatening neighbors in order to find other ways to secure their independence

and security. Poland, particularly endangered in her position between Germany

and Russia, completed that change in her policy under Foreign Minister Joseph

Beck who also declared in 1934 that his country would not consider herself bound

by the minorities treaty so long as the whole system was not extended to all

countries.

It was indeed difficult for the smaller nations of East Central Europe to

have any confidence in collective security when that security was to be assured

by pacts among the big powers, negotiated outside the League, or when the Soviet

Union, admitted to the League in September, 1934 almost simultaneously with

Germany’ withdrawal, suddenly appeared as a champion of the Geneva institution,

once so violently opposed, and of a collective security system. The League’

failure to stop aggression in Manchuria and Ethiopia made it easy to foresee

that she would be powerless also against totalitarian forces turning against

East Central Europe. And when at the last Assembly in December, 1939, the League

condemned at least one of the acts of aggression by excluding Soviet Russia, it

was too late. Too many aggressions had already been tolerated to save a peace

settlement which had lasted twenty years but which already in the thirties could

not be saved by mere confidence in the League of Nations.

TOWARD REGIONAL FEDERATIONS

Article 21 of the League’ Covenant encouraged the conclusion of regional

agreements. Nowhere was there a greater need for such agreements than in East

Central Europe where about a dozen independent states, most of them rather small

and none of them a great power, had so many common interests to develop and so

many common dangers to face. Contrary to widespread opinion, it was not the

creation or restoration of these states, misleadingly called a “

Balkanization”

of Europe, which was a source of trouble and difficulties. The liberation

movement which in the nineteenth century had started in the Balkans and which

after World War I included the whole area between Germany and Russia, was an act

of justice and a natural process based upon historical traditions as well as

modern aspirations which at last received satisfaction. On the contrary, it was

because that liberation had been so long delayed and continued to be challenged

by imperialistic neighbors who considered the independence of so many “

new”

states merely a provisional solution that the adjustment and stabilization of

the peace settlement proved such a delicate task and required the organized

cooperation of all the interested nations.

In an area where it was impossible to draft frontiers which would strictly

correspond to ethnic divisions and satisfy all economic requirements, none of

these nations could remain in isolation. The trend toward federalism which had

been so significant in earlier periods of their history reappeared as soon as

they regained their freedom. There had never been any federal union or even any

looser system of cooperation comprising all of them. Therefore, it was natural

that in the period between the two world wars more than one regional agreement

was planned in the East Central European area. Each of them developed only

gradually in the direction of a real federation or at least confederation,

without having the necessary time for reaching that goal. As usual in the

history of the whole area, the Baltic, Danubian, and Balkan regions had to be

distinguished, without there being, however, precise dividing lines between

them. In all three cases regional conferences or bilateral treaties were leading

to ententes, with the creation of permanent organs as the next step.

The Baltic conferences began as early as 1919 and at the outset included all

five states of East Central Europe which had access to and a vital interest in

the Baltic. Not only the three small specifically Baltic republics were

represented, but also Finland in the north and Poland in the south, which latter

seemed to lead the movement. But for that very reason the Polish-Lithuanian

conflict proved a serious obstacle to such general Baltic cooperation. From 1921

onward Lithuania no longer participated in these conferences, to the regret of

her closest neighbor, Latvia, which did not want to take sides in the conflict

and yet was particularly interested in the whole scheme. It was her able foreign

minister, S. Meierovics, who at the Baltic Conference of four states herd in

Warsaw in March, 1922, suggested joint action by these states in Geneva, and at

the conference of February, 1924, advocated the formal constitution of a Baltic

League.

Particularly successful seemed the next Baltic Conference which in January,

1925, met in Helsinki, where all four states signed treaties of conciliation and

arbitration and decided to set up interstate commissions of conciliation. But it

soon became apparent that Finland, host to that conference, was hesitating to

continue her cooperation because she did not want to become involved in any

possible conflicts between the other Baltic states and the Soviet Union. Hoping

that her security would be better guaranteed by a rapprochement with the

Scandinavian countries, Finland definitely turned in that direction in the

following years. In 1933 she joined the so-called Oslo Agreement which had been

concluded three years before between the Scandinavian kingdoms and the western

neutrals, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg.

Particularly close remained Finland’ cooperation with the Scandinavian

group, including Iceland, as was evidenced by the economic agreement of 1934 and

the regular conferences of foreign ministers.

Estonia and Latvia, allied with each other from 1924, continued to have very

friendly relations with Poland but eventually proved more interested in

establishing closer ties with the third small Baltic country, Lithuania, with

which they formed a Baltic Entente in 1934. This was much more limited than the

regional agreement which had originally been planned, but apparently it was

safer from entanglements in big-power politics. When the big neighbors decided

to interfere with the Baltic situation, the security of the three allies of

course proved to be an illusion. But their cooperation, inadequate in a European

crisis, gave valuable results in the last years of peace and in the framework of

the League of Nations.

In the Danubian area some kind of regional cooperation seemed particularly

desirable in view of the breakup of the Habsburg monarchy which had united the

Danubian lands for such a long time. But all projects for a Danubian federation

were regarded with suspicion by those who feared a restoration of the defunct

monarchy even in a disguised form. The antagonism between the two groups of

successor states, the victors and the vanquished, made impossible an agreement

including all of them. It was, therefore, only among the three countries which

had benefitted from the peace settlement and which feared its revision, which

Hungary so strongly requested, that the so-called Little Entente created a close

cooperation which was an important element of general European politics between

the two wars.

The entente was based upon three treaties: between Czechoslovakia and

Yugoslavia, of August 14, 1920; Czechoslovakia and Rumania, of April 23, 1921;

and finally Rumania and Yugoslavia, of June 7, 1921. Czechoslovak initiative,

particularly that of Dr. Benes, was evident, but prominent statesmen of the

other two countries were also deeply interested in an agreement which was to

guarantee all three against a possible Habsburg restoration, and especially

against “ unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary,”to which the

Yugoslav-Rumanian treaty also added the danger of a similar attack by Bulgaria.

Much more important than these original provisions against dangers which

were illusory so long as no great power supported the revisionist movement, was

the positive cooperation of at least three Danubian countries which jointly

defended the peace settlement and helped to consolidate it at numerous

international conferences within and outside the League of Nations. The

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