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Toward World War I

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Oscar Halecki, History of East Central Europe

19 TOWARD WORLD WAR I

THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM IN RUSSIA AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1905

It was not before the Revolution of 1905 that the outside world realized the

importance of the nationalities problem in the Russian Empire. Before that

internal crisis, aggravated by simultaneous defeats in the war with Japan, that

empire seemed so powerful that the dissatisfaction of its minority groups

appeared not to be too serious. Furthermore, in contradiction to the Habsburg

monarchy, where no nationality constituted an absolute majority, in the empire

of the czars the Russian majority seemed the more overwhelming because,

according to the official interpretation which was accepted by Western

scholarship, the Little Russians, as the Ukrainians continued to be called, and

the White Russians were not really nationalities that differed from the Great

Russians.

However, at least the former of these two, by far the largest non-Russian

group, were making steady progress in their national consciousness which already

toward the end of the nineteenth century created a serious revolutionary

movement. Furthermore, together with the Byelorussians, the Ukrainians were

living in that same western section of European Russia— the most advanced of the

whole empire— where several other nationalities, clearly distinct from the

Russians, were forming a belt of foreign elements along the whole western

frontier. This situation in the large part of East Central Europe which Russia

had annexed in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, but never succeeded

in absorbing, was therefore a much greater threat to the unity of the empire

than the ethnic problems of its Asiatic part or even those of the Caucasian

frontier region.

But Russian nationalism which was at its height under Alexander III and

during the first part of the reign of Nicholas II, and which was strongly

supported by their autocratic regimes succeeded in keeping even the most fully

developed nationalities at the western border under a strict control,

intensifying all methods of Russification. Therefore for forty years even the

Poles had to interrupt their armed struggle for independence, and though always

in close cultural community with their kinsmen in Prussia and Austria, they had

to postpone their hopes for liberation and political unification, making instead

a great effort in the field of economic and social progress. That so-called

“

organic labor,”taking advantage of a beginning industrialization of Russian

Poland, contributed to a rapid democratization of Polish society in the Western

sense. This was promoted by two political parties that were founded toward the

end of the century, the National Democratic Party under Roman Dmowski and the

Polish Socialist Party with Joseph Pilsudski as its most prominent leader, both

with branches in the other sections of partitioned Poland. Both had national

independence as their ultimate goal. This, however. seemed very distant, even to

the friends whom the Poles continued to have in the Western countries.

In these countries, besides the Poles, only one of the submerged

nationalities of the Russian Empire was sufficiently known to meet with

sympathetic understanding. These were the Finns, whose autonomy, after being

respected by the czars almost throughout the nineteenth century, was severely

restricted under Nicholas II. The Finns, who had never revolted before, reacted

by killing General Bobrikov, who as governor of Finland from 1898 on

consistently violated their rights, but this assassination made the situation

only worse. The Finnish Diet lost its constitutional powers, and Russian

officials as well as the Russian language were penetrating into the grand duchy.

Both the Finnish majority of the population and the small but culturally

important Swedish group were, however, so determined to defend their tradition,

so deeply attached to their democratic way of life, and in such well-established

contact with the Western world through Scandinavia, that Russian oppression

simply created another center of resistance there.

The Estonians on the other side of the Gulf of Finland, though racially

close kin of the Finns and influenced by their cultural revival, continued to

develop, along with the Latvians, in opposition to both Russification and German

social supremacy in the Baltic provinces. Landmarks in the rise of Estonian

nationalism were the compilation of the national epic, Kalevipoeg, published

between 1857 and 1861, and the foundation of a collection of all kinds of

popular traditions under the title of Monumenta Estoniae antiquae a little

later. Similarly, the Latvians created their own epic, Lacplesis, and started a

collection of popular songs which contributed to the awakening of a truly

national spirit. This was further augmented among both of these small ethnic

groups by the foundation of cultural societies and newspapers in the native

languages, as well as by an interest in archaeological research reviving their

prehistory, the only period in which they had been completely free.

Different in that respect was the Lithuanian national renaissance because

here a proud medieval tradition of independence could be evoked. New, however,

was the tendency to disregard the tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian Union which

had resulted in a Polonization of the upper classes, and to base the new

Lithuanian nationalism on ethnic and linguistic grounds. Writing in the

Lithuanian language was making progress in spite of all restrictions imposed by

the czarist regime. The first Lithuanian periodical, founded in Tilsit, East

Prussia, in 1883 under the name of Ausra (Dawn), was regularly smuggled into the

Russian-controlled country and its editor, Dr. Jonas Basanavicius, became the

leader of a national movement which created secret Lithuanian schools and

societies.

Even in the Lithuanian case there was, however, no clearly expressed

political aim before the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1905. That

revolution was primarily of a social and constitutional character. This was also

the case among the non-Russian nationalities which first joined the movement

with a view to replacing czarist absolutism by a parliamentary form of

government. While among the Russian revolutionaries there were only differences

among more or less radical parties, socialist and liberal, the socialist already

divided into Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, the program of the various nationalities

had a basically twofold aspect which recalled the role of the non-Germans in the

Austrian Revolution of 1848. In all the various ethnic groups there were radical

forces that were chiefly interested in a change of social conditions. But the

nationalist leaders at once realized that a constitutional reform of the empire

would be a unique occasion for obtaining equal rights at least in the field of

cultural development. And the trend toward federalism which used to appear among

all Russian revolutionaries, beginning with the Decembrists of 1825, seemed to

favor the rising claims for national autonomy.

Autonomy could not satisfy the Poles, as the events of the preceding century

had shown so many times, and the Polish Socialist Party of Pilsudski, decidedly

aiming at full independence, was completely apart from the so-called “

Social

Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania”which put social revolution

first. The National Democrats under Dmowski, however, considered it more

realistic to work for autonomy as a preliminary step and to take advantage of

the opportunities which the czar’ October Manifesto and the creation of the

Duma seemed to offer.

In that first Russian Parliament which opened on May 10, 1906, the Poles,

along with other national groups, had indeed a fairly large representation. They

continued to cooperate with the Russian liberals not only in the second but also

in the third Duma in which the number of their deputies was greatly reduced and

the representation of all other nationalities became insignificant. The failure

of these latter can be explained not only by the repression of the whole

revolutionary movement but also by the lack of clearly defined programs. Only in

Finland, which claimed, of course, the re-establishment of her constitutional

government, was that aim achieved in November, 1905. But even the Lithuanian

Diet, which assembled in Wilno (Vilnius) at the beginning of the following month

and which decidedly claimed an autonomous Lithuania with her own parliament,

though federated with the other states of the former empire, received only vague

promises from the local Russian authorities which were completely disregarded

after the doom of the revolution. The social element definitely prevailed in the

Ukrainian movement, and even more among the Latvians and Estonians, who like all

other nationalities were hoping for some kind of autonomy and claimed it in the

first Duma, but chiefly turned against the German landowners only to be

ruthlessly repressed by Russian troops.

What the non-Russian nationalities gained through the 1905 Revolution was

therefore very little and mainly of a temporary character. The most shocking

restrictions as, for instance, the interdiction of Lithuanian publications

printed in the Latin alphabet or the almost complete prohibition of publications

in the Ukrainian language, were lifted, thus making possible some progress in

the development of national culture. The edict of April, 1905, granting

religious tolerance, but not for the Uniate church, was followed by the passing

of many former Uniates from Orthodoxy to Catholicism of the Latin rite. The

Poles, though disappointed like all the others in their hopes for any autonomy,

were at least permitted to open private schools in their own language under the

auspices of a voluntary society. But when even that private organization was

abolished at the end of 1907, this was a clear indication that the growing

reaction which followed after the revolution would also turn against the most

modest rights of the non-Russian nationalities. Among several other measures

directed particularly against the Poles, the separation of the Cheim district

from Congress Poland, where conditions were still somewhat better than in the

rest of the empire, which had been announced in 1909 and was carried out three

years later, was particularly resented.

At the same time the old program of Pan-Slavism was revived under the

misleading name of “

Neo-Slavism,”which was to distinguish it from the earlier

movement under an openly Russian leadership. Even now, however, there was no

place for the Ukrainians in the Slavic community. And even the Poles, among whom

Dmowski had favored the new conception, were soon completely disillusioned and

ceased to participate in these Slavic congresses. Dmowski’ own attitude can

only be understood in the light of his conviction that Poland’ main enemy was

Germany, where indeed the anti-Polish policy of the Prussian government was

reaching its climax. However, not only many Poles but also other Slavs,

discouraged by Russian imperialism, were looking toward the third of the empires

which had divided Poland and, in general, East Central Europe. This was the

Habsburg monarchy where the problem of nationalities continued to be discussed

in an entirely different spirit from that which prevailed in Russia after the

interlude of 1905 and in spite of Russia’ entente with the democratic powers of

Western Europe.

THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM IN THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

The whole history of Austria-Hungary from its constitution as a dual monarchy to

its fall half a century later is the instructive story of a serious effort to

solve the problem of a multinational state with an unusually complicated

composition and structure, particularly after the occupation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina in 1878. The annexation of these two provinces, thirty years later,

though a natural consequence of the occupation and continued administration,

provoked another international crisis which once more disclosed the intimate

connection between the internal nationalities problem and the foreign policy of

the monarchy.

In order to understand that connection, it must be remembered that the

numerous nationalities of Austria-Hungary were clearly divided into two groups.

The really important distinction is, however, not that usually made between the

so-called historic and non-historic nationalities, but that between nations

which in their entirety were living within the boundaries of the monarchy, and

fragments of nations whose larger part was outside these frontiers. As to the

latter, an additional distinction must be made between such minorities as were

attracted by an independent national state on the other side of the border, as

was the case of the Italians, Serbs, and Rumanians, and those nations which had

no state of their own at all, their major part remaining under a foreign rule

much more oppressive than that of the Habsburgs. This was the case of the Poles

and the Ukrainians.

The relatively most numerous group, the German Austrians or Austrian

Germans, could hardly be placed in any of these categories. If their German

character is emphasized, they would seem to be in a situation analogous to that

of the Italian, Serb, or Rumanian “

irredenta.”And there was indeed among them a

certain number of Pan-Germanists with a loyalty divided between Berlin and

Vienna if not influenced more by the former than by the latter. Conscious of a

racial and linguistic community and inspired by the tradition of the Holy Roman

Empire, they were disappointed at not belonging to that second purely German

Empire which the Hohenzollerns were making much more powerful than the empire of

the Habsburgs where the Germans had to share their influence with almost a dozen

other nationalities. But on the other hand, only by remaining in the Dual

Monarchy could these Austrian Germans continue to control these other groups,

all of which were economically and socially weaker than the Germans and,

according to the German interpretation, on a lower cultural level. And only

through the Austrian Germans could the Habsburg monarchy be kept under the

political influence, if not direction, of the new German Empire as its

“

brilliant second.”Furthermore, there were many German-speaking Austrians who

were indeed first, if not exclusively, loyal subjects of the Habsburgs, who were

definitely opposed to the Prussian spirit which inspired the Reich of the

Hohenzollerns, who were devoted to the separate Austrian tradition and

interested in what they considered their historic mission of unifying the

Danubian region in cooperation with its non-German populations.

How far these German Austrians, practically a distinct nationality, would go

in recognizing the equal rights of the non-German nationalities of Austria, that

was another problematic question. In any event they had to recognize the equal

rights guaranteed to the Hungarians in the Compromise of 1867, and it was only

natural for them to do so, since the Hungarians, or strictly speaking, the

Magyars of Hungary just one-half of the kingdom’ population were next to the

German Austrians most interested in the existence of the Dual Monarchy in which

they enjoyed a privileged position. And since most of the Magyar leaders,

fearful of Slavic influence, were also in favor of the alliance with the German

Empire, their understanding with all Germans of Austria was one of the

foundations of the whole policy of the monarchy, internal and external,

irrespective of the claims of the German minority in Hungary and of occasional

friction in the parliamentary delegations, chiefly on financial issues.

Even jointly, however, Germans and Magyars, about twenty-two millions, were

inferior in number to the twenty-four million Slavs of the monarchy. And without

even speaking of almost totally Slavic Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the Austrian part

the Slavs constituted more than two-thirds of the population. Fully aware of the

impossibility of keeping that Austrian part under the supremacy of the German

minority which thanks to an unfair electoral law continued even after 1867,

prime minister Count Edward Taaffe, of Irish descent, who was appointed to his

office in 1879 and held it for fourteen years, decided to base his

administration on the respect of nationality rights. He was supported by the

Poles, who at least had the chance of free cultural life only in Austria, and

who gradually developed the self-government of Galicia. He was also supported by

most of the Czechs who under the Taaffe regime received numerous concessions.

These included the opening of a Czech university in Prague in 1882 alongside the

old one which had long since been Germanized. Along with all the other Slavic

nationalities they profited from new regulations with regard to respect for

their linguistic rights. The social progress made during these same years was to

be implemented by a democratic reform of the electoral law.

But when that project was attacked by both conservatives and radicals, the

Germans, who had always been opposed to the Taaffe ministry which as they said

kept them in an “

iron ring,”reversed it at last. And it was only three years

later that another prime minister, this time a Pole, Count Casimir Badeni,

returned to the idea of similar reforms in the direction of both a strict

enforcement of linguistic equality and a gradual extension of the right to vote.

The following year, however, Badeni fell victim to German obstructionism in

parliament and it was not until 1907 that universal equal suffrage was

established in Austria.

Prime Minister Baron Beck who carried out that reform, as well as the

emperor who approved it in spite of his conservative leanings, hoped that a

larger representation of the Left, concerned with class interests, would reduce

the friction among the various nationalities. But at the same time the

representation of the non-German peoples was increased, and it soon became

obvious that the lower classes too, including the peasant parties and to a

certain extent even the Socialists, were animated by strong nationalist feelings

which continued to create difficulties in the legislature, whether central or

provincial, and in the administration. Even minor issues affecting the weakest

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