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Political Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1997

Optimism and Revolt of the Oppressed:

A Comparison of Two Polish Jewish Ghettos of

World War II

Larissa Z. Tiedens

Department of Psychology,

University of Michigan

One World War II Jewish ghetto that revolted, the Warsaw Ghetto, is compared to one that

did not, the Lodz Ghetto, in order to examine the causes of violent resistance. This structured

focused comparative method (George, 1979) illuminates problems with previous explanations

for revolt and nonrevolt in Jewish ghettos and suggests psychological variables that might

have led to or precluded organized violence. Specifically, it appears that these two ghettos

differed in their perceptions about their future. The residents of the Warsaw Ghetto believed

they had no hope of survival while residents of the Lodz Ghetto remained optimistic. These

differing perceptions seem to have led to the different outcomes. Possible causes of these

perceptions are also discussed.

KEY WORDS:

revolt; Holocaust; relative deprivation; comparative case study; optimism

People can respond to oppression in many ways. Some react violently, while

others do not, and some even seem to “cooperate” with their oppression. Psycholo-

gists have long been interested in what determines which of these behaviors will

be displayed (Gurr, 1970; Levy, 1981). Here, possible psychological mechanisms

and their social structural underpinnings will be addressed in a context where

cooperation and opposition have been much discussed (Arendt, 1964; Bettelheim,

1943; de Beauvoir, 1994; Steiner, 1994).

Whether, why, and how Jews cooperated with the Nazis or rebelled against

them has been a central question in studies of the Holocaust. Plagued with political

sensitivities, this literature consists of many apologies for and admonishments of

so-called collaborators along with celebrations and idealization of brave rebels.

Most of those interested in Jewish behavior during the Holocaust have examined

Jews in only one location (e.g. Steiner’s, 1994 depiction of the revolt at Treblinka)

Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK.

Tiedens

or examined only a certain kind of behavior (e.g. Bettelheim’s 1943 discussion of

identification with the aggressor). There is little comparative work that explains

why Jews in some locations staged revolts while others elsewhere did not. In this

study, however, two different groups of Jews—one which revolted and another that

did not—are compared. Though there are certainly many kinds of variables that

contribute to the creation of a revolt, the focus here will be on the psychology of

the revolters and nonrevolters. For, as one of the organizers of the Warsaw revolt

said, “This was a war of less than a thousand people against a mighty army, and no

one doubted how it was likely to turn out. This is not a subject for study in military

school. . . . If there is a school to study the

human spirit,

there it should be a major

subject” (Zuckerman, 1993, p. xiii).

The comparative method has gained popularity in the psychological study of

collective violence because it can provide a relatively systematic test of hypotheses

about behavior not ethically producible in the laboratory (Holsti, 1972; Winter,

1993). Here A. L. George’s (1979) method of structured focused comparison is

used. A comparison of the Warsaw and Lodz Ghettos fits this method well since

they differ on the behavior in question (revolt) but are similar in so many other

ways. Just 60 miles apart, both Warsaw and Lodz were considered Polish Jewish

religious and cultural centers before the war. During the war they contained two of

the largest ghettos. In both ghettos residents manufactured equipment for the

German army. The large populations were forced in a tiny amount of space. Though

the exact figures cannot be reconstructed (see Dobroszycki, 1984, for a discussion

of the problems with recorded numbers), it is estimated that 380,000 Jews were

forced into an area under a square mile in Warsaw and 220,000 into around a square

mile in Lodz. Both places were plagued by starvation, disease, and Nazi violence.

The mortality rate, similar in the two ghettos, reflects the seriousness of this

problem. In 1940 about 3% of ghetto residents died from hunger and sickness, by

1941 this rate increased to almost 10%, and by 1942 to 15%. Both ghettos

experienced an increase in population when the Nazis shipped in Jews from

elsewhere. Then decreases occurred when they deported the sick, the elderly, the

children, and then large groups of healthy men and women in the

aktions,

or mass

deportations, of 1942, during which 80-90% of the populations were sent to

concentration camps.

Despite all these similarities, the two ghettos experienced very different

outcomes. The Warsaw Ghetto residents fought a 40-day war from April 19 to May

16, 1943, that concluded with the complete destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto. No

such battle occurred in the Lodz Ghetto. In fact, to this day, the Lodz Ghetto has

the reputation of being the most cooperative of all Polish ghettos with Nazi requests

(Adelson & Lapides, 1989; Ausubel, 1953). Even during the war, when the head

of the German Ghetto Administration for Lodz was asked if there was any

possibility that an uprising could occur in Lodz he answered, “Events similar to the

ones in Warsaw are totally impossible in the Lodz Ghetto” (Biebow, 1943/1989,

p. 382).

Optimism and Revolt

METHOD AND OVERVIEW

George (1979) recommended the method of structured focused comparison as

a “building block . . . for theory development,” and that will be the function of this

comparison. The goal of this investigation was not to support or refute any

particular theory, but rather it was to understand the psychology underlying the

differences in the behaviors of these particular places and then to improve theories

meant to understand these behaviors. Thus, without adherence to any theory of

revolt, as many primary and secondary sources printed in English as could be

located were read. Impressions of the psychological profiles of these places were

based on a reading of these sources as a whole, not on any single source, nor due

to a particular theoretical perspective. The sources were grouped by the location

from which they originated and to which they pertained. There was no information

about individual differences within locations so the analyses could not be extended

to examine whether disagreements within a location were due to the same factors

that led to differences between locations.

Starting with historical documentation, rather than with a theory, allows for

the use of these examples in the way that George (1979) originally intended. The

events of these places will be used to see how well various theories meant to explain

such instances can explain them. Using two similar cases with different outcomes

provides a better test of an explanation than one case could provide and may suggest

what is missing from these theories.

This comparative method was first useful in casting doubt on previous expla-

nations of revolt by historians and social scientists. The inadequacy of theories

previously presented by historians to explain these behaviors in these locations will

be discussed first. Then, the written documents will be used to illustrate that the

psychological mechanisms governing revolt versus nonrevolt appear to be quite

different from those usually suggested by social scientists. Specifically, though

social scientists have tended to converge on the hypothesis that optimism is

necessary for revolt, here a total

lack

of optimism—that is, hopelessness—seems

most predictive of revolt. A final advantage of the structured focused comparison

method is that the investigator can look in depth at how the variables of interest

were created in their natural historical context (George, 1979). Optimism is an

important variable in this study as well as in many others, so this structured focused

comparison will be used to look at how these different states of hope were created

in the two communities. This description will rely heavily on the historical

particulars of these situations, but attempts at generalization to other cases will be

made.

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PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE

WARSAW AND LODZ GHETTOS

The behaviors of residents of both ghettos have been of interest to many

previous scholars. Most of the work on this topic tends to be descriptive rather than

theoretical; explanations for revolt and nonrevolt are often only implicit. These

theories usually originated from the investigation of just one of these locations, and

when used to explain the different outcome of the other ghetto, they typically fail.

In the following section the necessity of a new explanation for why one ghetto

revolted when the other did not will become clear, as the comparative method

indicates that none of the historical explanations is adequate.

Jewish Chairmen

Historians of the Lodz Ghetto seem to have agreed upon a psychological

interpretation of why organized resistance did not occur in the Lodz Ghetto. The

lack has primarily been explained by, or blamed on, the Jewish chairman there,

Mordechai Chaim Rumkowski. The Nazi officials chose one Jewish man in each

ghetto to lead the council of Jews, a group acting as a liaison between the ghetto

and the Nazis. Because of the council’s affiliation with the Nazis, the assignment

was a dubious honor. Rumkowski, more than the Jewish chairmen from other

ghettos, is vilified by historians and presented as a powermonger who would do

anything to gain the favor of the Nazis, including sending his own people to death.

He is accused of running a corrupt government and squelching the truth about the

future of Jews he claimed to protect. Ausubel says of Rumkowski, “He served the

Nazis by deceiving the Jews in his charge and delivering them to the gas chambers”

(Ausubel, 1953, p. 261). Adelson (1989) asks, “If it had not been for Rumkowski’s

deceitful . . . assurances of their safety . . . would so many of those people have

willingly boarded the trains?” (p. 494).

In comparison, Adam Czerniakow, the chairman of the Jews in Warsaw, is

presented as a hero who “took poison rather than carry out German orders to deliver

the ghetto’s children and elderly” (Adelson, 1989, p. 489). Czerniakow killed

himself, though,

after

he had already helped organize the deportations out of

Warsaw. Of course, Czerniakow did not know what he had been helping to arrange,

but on the other hand, Rumkowski probably did not know where his people were

headed either. Trunk (1972) quotes Rumkowski speaking to the Lodz Ghetto

residents:

I have firm hope that the fate of the resettled people is not going to be so

tragic as has commonly been feared in the ghetto. They will not be put

behind wires. . . . I guarantee with my own head that the working people

will be subjected to no injustice. (p. 415)

Optimism and Revolt

And indeed, when Rumkowski was deported, he boarded the train calmly, indicat-

ing that he believed the destination safe.

Gutman (1982) says that Czerniakow was also thought to be a powermonger

who willingly helped the Nazis for his own benefit but when his diary was found

amidst the rubble of Warsaw, it was discovered that his intentions were pure.

Additionally, Dobroszycki (1984) refers to private notes of Rumkowski’s which

indicate that he too seriously considered suicide at the beginnings of the mass

deportations.

The chairman to replace Czerniakow, Marc Lichtenbaum, participated in a way

quite similar to Rumkowski, and though Adelson implies that had it not been for

Rumkowski, Lodz Ghetto residents would have revolted during deportations, even

the Warsaw Ghetto revolt did not occur until well after the mass deportations.

Thus, it is questionable if there were really important differences between the

chairmen of the Jews in the two ghettos. Neither seemed to have known where the

deportees were headed, both followed most orders given to them, as did their

successors, and both seemed to have experienced deep anxiety and pain about their

official role. Trunk’s (1972) thorough study of the World War II Jewish governing

councils across Europe indicates that overall there was a great deal of similarity

among them. He further claims that the individual members made no difference in

the ultimate outcomes of the ghettos. It appears inaccurate, then, to understand the

lack of organized revolt in the Lodz Ghetto in terms of Rumkowski’s cooperation

and deception, or the occurrence of organized revolt in terms of Czerniakow’s

resistant attitude.

The Personality of Jewish Resistance Leaders

The most prominent “theory” of why a revolt occurred in Warsaw is that the

particular individuals who recruited, planned, and fought were brave and charis-

matic (Gutman, 1982, Steiner, 1994). While those involved with revolts against the

Nazis were certainly courageous, such an explanation implies that in locations such

as Warsaw and Vilna there were brave individuals, whereas in other locations such

as Lodz there weren’t. However, even a cursory look at an anthology of documents

from Lodz (Adelson & Lapides, 1989) clearly illustrates that there was no lack of

bravery and courage in the Lodz Ghetto.

Political Factions

Gutman (1982) provides an explanation of revolt when he addresses why the

Warsaw Ghetto uprising did not occur earlier. He argues that the ghetto residents

took so long to revolt because there were so many political factions who disagreed

on various issues. The uprising, he says, was only possible when groups agreed to

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