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MATILDAS ON CRETE
THE BATTLE OF SALAMAUA
75>
9
770306 154103
No. 175
£5.00
NUMBER 175
© Copyright
After the Battle
2017
Editor: Karel Margry
Editor-in-Chief: Winston G. Ramsey
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Its key position in the eastern Mediterranean made Crete of strategic value to both
the Allies and the Axis, leading Britain to station a land, naval and air garrison there
and Germany to plan and carry out an airborne invasion.
British interest in Crete can be traced back
to the origins of the Second World War and
the policy developed jointly by Britain and
France of isolating Italy, without openly
antagonising her. Realising that Italy was
firmly in the Axis camp, Britain and France
were also aware that Italy was quite unpre-
pared for war. Instead their main strategy
became one of non-provocation, while con-
taining Italy within the Mediterranean,
through the joint actions of their fleets as
well as blocking the Straits of Gibraltar and
the Suez Canal. Greece and Turkey were
also important, the latter because of its con-
trol of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus —
their principal supply route for raw materials
from the Black Sea — and Greece because
the Corinth Canal provided Italian merchant
ships with a more direct route to Italy and
one far from the British Mediterranean
Fleet. Crete was important to the British
because it would give their naval forces a for-
ward base, while airfields on it could be used
to counter the Luftwaffe.
This all changed with the fall of France
when Italy, driven by greed, finally entered
the war, militarily, on the side of Germany.
Nevertheless, Britain continued to court
both Greece and Turkey and their persis-
tence was finally rewarded on October 28,
1940 when Italy declared war on Greece and
invaded Greek-controlled Epirus from Alba-
nia. The British responded to this by sending
some fighter and bomber squadrons to
Greece, setting up a naval base in Suda Bay
on Crete and garrisoning the island with a
brigade of infantry, which in turn allowed the
Greeks to withdraw the Cretan Division
from the island. They also began to improve
the airfield at Heraklion to take Bristol
Blenheim light bombers and build another
airfield at Maleme. Following the death of
the Greek Prime Minister General Ionnas
Metaxas, the Greeks finally accepted the
British offer of support and this, in the form
of W Force, was shipped over in March.
In the end, Germany invaded both
Yugoslavia and Greece in April, overrunning
the former in two weeks and the latter in
three. This still left the British with a pres-
ence in Crete, albeit a small one, but it was
evident as early as a week before the with-
drawal of W Force from Greece that British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill still had a
firm resolve to hold the island. Thus, its plans
to use fast capital ships and Crete as an inter-
mediary stop-off point for their troops from
Greece, actually provided Britain with a way
to reinforce its Crete garrison, albeit surrep-
titiously.
The strategic importance of Crete was not
lost on the Germans either, the idea of using
airborne forces to take it gaining some trac-
tion at the Oberkommando des Heeres
(Army High Command, OKH) as early as
October 1940. The idea came up again
around the time of the start of the invasion of
Greece among the staff of Luftflotte IV and
then later when Generalleutnant Kurt Stu-
dent, the commander of the XI. Flieger-
korps, put the idea to Reichsmarschall Her-
mann Göring. After further discussions
Adolf Hitler agreed to this proposal and thus
on April 28 Operation ‘Merkur’, the air-
borne invasion of Crete, was born. The
British soon learned of German intentions
through Ultra decrypts and set about prepar-
ing their defences. General Bernard Frey-
berg, VC, was selected as the commander of
the new force, to be known as Creforce, the
defence to be based around the three air-
fields at Maleme, Rethymno and Heraklion,
but with provision to deal with a seaborne
invasion, the bulk of their forces to be con-
centrated at the western end of the island
(see
After the Battle
No. 47).
CONTENTS
MATILDA TANKS ON CRETE
PACIFIC
The Battle for Salamaua
2
20
NEW ZEALAND
Wellington’s WWII Harbour Defences 36
IT HAPPENED HERE
Massacre at Hannover
53
Front Cover:
In May 1941 the 7th Royal
Tank Regiment sent nine Matilda tanks to
Crete to reinforce the Allied garrison there.
All nine were knocked out or left behind
during the subsequent German airborne
invasion of the island. This is T7402,
abandoned at Heraklion and ending up at
nearby Karteros Beach, a popular photo
venue for German soldiers during their
occupation of Crete. (Robert Gregory/Mark
Wilson)
Back Cover:
The cemetery of honour on
Arthur-Menge-Ufer in the city of Hannover,
Germany, where 386 victims of Nazi
forced-labour and concentration camps are
buried, among them 154 Russian slave
workers and prisoners of war murdered by
the Gestapo in the Seelhorst municipal
cemetery on April 6, 1945 — four days
before the American capture of the city.
The memorial, dedicated in October 1945,
erroneously dates the massacre to April 8.
(Karel Margry)
Photo Credit Abbreviations:
ATL —
Alexander Turnbull Library; AWM —
Australian War Memorial; USHMM — US
Holocaust Memorial Museum; USNA —
US National Archives.
2
During the battle for Crete, which lasted from May 20 to
June 1, 1941, the British and Dominion and Greek forces
defending the island had very little armoured support, the
only available tank units being C Squadron of the 3rd Royal
Hussars fielding 16 Light Mark VI tanks, and two troops from
B Squadron of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment with a strength
of six (later nine) Matilda Mk II tanks. These tanks were dis-
tributed over the various defensive sectors set up on the
island’s northern shore, the 3rd Hussars sending six to Her-
aklion and seven to Canea (three were unserviceable), and
the 7th Royal Tanks dispatching pairs of Matildas to bolster
up the defences of the three airfields at Maleme, Rethymno
and Heraklion. After the German airborne invasion had
started, the tanks were committed in various attempts to
counter-attack, with mixed success. Several were knocked
out, others bogged down, some were recovered and carried
on fighting with improvised Australian crews, but in the end
all those still operable after 12 days of battle had to be left
behind in the final evacuation from the island. This is
Gnome
III,
one of the pair of Matildas that was sent to Rethymno,
pictured in the location where it was knocked out during the
failed Australian attack on Perivolia on the 27th. (Each bat-
talion of the Royal Tank Regiment adopted tank names
beginning with the equivalent letter of the alphabet to their
number. Thus, the 7th Royal Tanks named all their tanks
starting with the seventh letter ‘G’.)
MATILDA TANKS ON CRETE
TANKS FOR CRETE
One of the problems facing Freyberg was
that his troops, having abandoned all of their
heavy weapons in Greece, were considerably
under-resourced when it came to facing up to
the forthcoming airborne invasion. In the
end these deficiencies were never properly
made up. A number of troops were simply
withdrawn from the island because there
were insufficient weapons for them, while
what artillery that could be made available
was obsolete by modern standards and even
lacked basic items such as gunsights.
The British did have some armour in the
form of 35 Bren and Universal carriers that
had come over with the three battalions sent
over in 1940 and plans were afoot to aug-
ment them with tanks. In fact earlier on in
April, C Squadron of the 3rd King’s Own
Hussars, commanded by Major Gilbert Peck,
had been pulled out of Tobruk and sent back
to Alexandria just for this purpose. A search
around the workshops in the Delta area dug
up 16 Light Vickers Mk VI tanks, most in
various stages of disrepair. All lacked func-
tional wireless sets but sufficient were
obtained before they departed for Crete on
May 11, though there was no time to fit
them. On the 14th their ship, the
SS Dales-
man,
anchored in Suda Bay but even before
they had started to unload their tanks and
lorries the harbour came under attack from
By Jeffrey Plowman, Michael Grieve and Mark Wilson
the Luftwaffe. Worse still, their ship took a
hit from a bomb that passed through the aft
cargo hatch and blew a hole in the hull. With
the ship taking on water, the crew beached it.
The squadron was keen to recover its vehi-
cles and fortunately all of them were in the
forward hold. However, there was some
equipment in the rear hold, including a few
of the wireless sets, and these ultimately
could not be recovered. Though there was no
power to the ship’s winches, due to the
engine room being flooded, they still man-
aged to start unloading their tanks the fol-
lowing morning and by 6.15 p.m. had got all
16 of them off, transferring them by lighters
to the shore. The vehicles had not suffered
much from their ordeal, only one failing to
start up so it was towed to the Ordnance
workshops in Suda. After some persuasion
they also managed to convince the port
authorities to bring another ship alongside to
assist in the unloading and on the 16th, with
its help, they also got their lorries off.
On the 18th, six of the tanks departed for
Heraklion under the command of 2nd Lieu-
tenant Jack Clarke but several hours later
one of them returned, suffering from a bro-
ken selector fork that had considerably
reduced its speed. It too was sent to the Ord-
nance workshops and a replacement pro-
vided for its crew. The next day, the remain-
ing seven tanks set out for Canea, a further
tank having to be sent to the workshops
because they could not get it mobile.
In contrast, the decision to send over
Matilda tanks (heavier and designed for
infantry support, they were usually referred
to as ‘I’ (Infantry) tanks) to Crete appears to
have been an afterthought. It was only on
May 8 that the 7th Royal Tank Regiment,
then at Sidi Bashar, Egypt, was ordered to
select two troops of tanks, i.e. six Matildas,
and have them ready to leave Egypt within a
week. The regiment duly complied the next
day, drawing three officers and 35 other
ranks from their B Squadron, only to find
themselves down at the docks in Alexandria
on the 10th and the next day on their way to
Crete. The plan for deployment of the
detachment was for pairs of Matildas to be
sent to each of the three airfields — Maleme
(defended by the 5th Brigade of the 2nd New
Zealand Division), Rethymno (protected by
two Australian and two Greek battalions)
and Heraklion (held by the British 14th
Infantry Brigade, one Australian and two
Greek battalions) — to bolster up their
defensive strength.
3
MICHAEL GRIEVE
MALEME-CANEA
RETHYMNO
HERAKLION
NEW ZEALAND OFFICIAL HISTORY
TIMBÁKION
The battle of Crete began with fighting in three widely separated areas: Maleme-Canea, Rethymno and Heraklion.
At least their arrival in Suda Bay on the
13th was somewhat less fraught than that of
the 3rd Hussars. After disembarking, the
detachment commander, Captain Samuel
‘Sandy’ Badrock, sent Lieutenant George
Simpson to conduct a recce around Rethymno
and Lieutenant John Johnson to do the same
at Heraklion, while Badrock met up with
Brigadier James Hargest, commander of the
5th New Zealand Brigade. Badrock then spent
some time scouting suitable laying-up sites for
the two Matildas that were to go to Maleme
airfield, with some difficultly as it turned out,
considering this to be hardest of the three air-
fields. Eventually he settled on two depres-
sions some 300 to 400 yards apart at the base
of Hill 107. Leaving instructions for two revet-
ments to be dug for them and for an irrigation
ditch between them and the airfield to be filled
in, Badrock returned to Suda Bay.
By the time he got back the six tanks had
been unloaded, the two for Maleme first, and
after dividing up the spares Sergeants A. J.
Gosnold and Francis Marshall drove them
two miles up the road to a position that gave
them good cover from the air. After dark, a
lighter arrived to take the two tanks to Her-
aklion but the lighter for the Rethymno-
bound tanks did not show up, it had broken
down apparently. Captain Badrock then
joined Gosnold’s and Marshall’s tanks –
T7368
Gnu III
and T7398
Greenloaning
–
and set off for Maleme, a journey that
involved a number of detours, as far as the
beach in one case, as some bridges proved
incapable of taking them. The gearbox in
Marshall’s Matilda also gave trouble and at
times his driver could not engage the gears at
all. In the end they had to find another loca-
tion to lie up for the day.
When Badrock got back to Suda on the
14th he discovered that the lighter had still
not arrived for the two tanks for Rethymno
and there was no indication from the Navy as
to when it would be ready. As nothing could
be done till nightfall he set about sorting out
the stores for the tanks and getting these to
their respective airfields. Finding sufficient
diesel for the vehicles proved to be another
problem but someone from the RASC suc-
ceeded in the end. Their ship, still carrying
some of their stores, was also bombed later
that day but they managed to get the rest of
these off. When Badrock returned to
Maleme that evening he found that the
revetments for the tanks were not ready so
he located a second lying-up point closer to
the airfield and ordered Gosnold and Mar-
shall to make for there the next night.
When there was still no sign of the lighter
for the Rethymno tanks on the 15th,
Badrock ordered them to drive over that
night. The pair set off, but just to the west of
Georgiopolis one of them broke down. An
ordnance officer, who had been travelling
with them, went back to Suda to make a
replacement bearing as they had no spares of
any sort with them. With this they managed
to get the tank going again the following
night but it broke down again after travelling
another ten miles. By this stage the other
tank had made it to Rethymno, so what fol-
lowed was a complicated set of gymnastics.
On the 19th the ordnance officer took a good
bearing off the tank at Rethymno, fitted it to
the broken-down tank, which then set off for
the airfield. In the meantime he returned to
Canea to make another, which he said could
be done within 24 hours.
Badrock then went back to Maleme where
he and Sergeant Gosnold met with Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Leslie Andrew, the comman-
der of the 22nd NZ Battalion. During that
meeting they brought him up to date with the
situation regarding the tanks and impressed on
him that the tanks were under orders not to be
used except if enemy troop carriers landed on
the aerodrome. That done, and before leaving,
Badrock arranged for spare batteries to be
sent Gosnold as his were flat. This was of suffi-
cient concern to him that when he returned to
Canea he arranged for batteries to be sent to
all the other tanks as well.
3
4
1
2
The two Matildas sent to Maleme airfield — T7368
Gnu III
and
T7398 Greenloaning —
were put under command of the 22nd
New Zealand Battalion of the 5th New Zealand Brigade.
Primarily responsible for the defence of the airfield itself was
4
C Company, which had No. 13 Platoon north of the airstrip
itself; No. 15 Platoon to the west of it, overlooking the Tavroni-
tis river, and No. 14 Platoon between the road and an irrigation
ditch, with Company HQ to the east of them.
The two Matildas were sited in revetments in depressions
some 300 to 400 yards apart at the base of Hill 107 — marked
[1] and [2] on the map. During the counter-attack at Maleme on
May 20, the lead one,
Gnu III
commanded by Sergeant A. J.
Gosnold, drove down into the Tavronitis riverbed and swung
to the right under the bridge, before heading further down-
MALEME – MAY 20
T7368
Gnu III
(Sergeant A. J. Gosnold)
T7398
Greenloaning
(Sergeant Francis Marshall)
The main defence around Maleme was
based around Andrew’s 22nd NZ Battalion,
whose C Company was on the landing ground,
D Company bordering the Tavronitis river
south of the bridge, A Company on Hill 107, B
Company to the south-west of A Company
and HQ Company in Pirgos. Further support
came from Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas
Leckie’s 23rd NZ Battalion to the east of Pir-
gos and Lieutenant-Colonel John Allen’s 21st
NZ Battalion to the south of 23rd Battalion.
Like any other day the morning of May 20
started out with the usual morning ‘hate’
from the Luftwaffe, albeit a little more
intense than others. Then around 7.30 a.m.
the first gliders of the 3. Kompanie of the I.
Bataillon (Major Walter Koch) of General-
major Eugen Meindl’s Luftlande-Sturm-
Regiment swept in. After overrunning the
anti-aircraft position at the mouth of the
Tavronitis, they tried to advance inland but
ran into heavy fire from C Company, their
stream towards the sea. It eventually came to a halt in an area
[3] that was noted to be seething with enemy troops. After
remaining motionless for a time, the crew was observed to
climb out and surrender. The parachute supply containers, dis-
carded by the paratroopers of the Luftlande-Sturm-Regiment,
are evidence of the German presence.
on the river. There they linked up with
Koch’s force, taking control of the RAF
camp, in the process driving a wedge
between C and D Companies. Other Ger-
man moves were not so successful, attempts
to get between A and B Companies by Major
Edgar Stentzler’s II. Bataillon being blocked
by the 21st NZ Battalion. The paratroopers
in the RAF camp also failed to extend their
hold to the lower slopes of Hill 107. They
launched an attack pushing some air force
prisoners ahead of them but when they got
close enough to the New Zealand lines some-
one yelled at the prisoners to drop, at which
point the New Zealand platoon opened up,
killing many of the paratroopers and forcing
the rest to retire. Around midday, Student,
thinking that Maleme was now under Ger-
man control, sent over two Junkers Ju 52
troop carrier aircraft but as the first started
to touch down it was hit by intense rifle and
machine-gun fire, shattering windscreens and
ripping holes in the fuselage, very nearly fail-
ing to take off again. A second attempt in the
afternoon met the same response.
commander Oberleutnant Wulff Freiherr
von Plessen being among those killed. Ober-
leutnant Kurt Sarrazin’s 4. Kompanie fared
no better coming down south of the airfield,
many of their gliders flipping over as they
struck the rugged riverbed. Those that sur-
vived were driven off by fire from 22nd NZ
Battalion. Another cluster of nine gliders
under Major Franz Braun, however, man-
aged to land close to the Tavronitis bridge,
which they assaulted and, though suffering
heavy casualties, including Braun who was
killed, managed to secure, forcing the right
wing of D Company to pull back to the irri-
gation ditch at the base of Hill 107.
Of the parachutists of the assault regiment,
those of Major Otto Scherber’s III. Bataillon
who landed within the 23rd NZ Battalion
area were, for all practical purposes,
destroyed as a fighting unit within minutes.
However, Hauptmann Walter Gericke’s IV.
Bataillon landed unopposed to the west of
the Tavronitis and, although many of their
heavy weapons and motorcycles were dam-
aged, Gericke’s troops managed to close up
When Mark Wilson visited Crete in May 2016 for the 75th
commemorations of the battle, he found a lot had changed
in the Tavronitis valley since the war (and even since Jean
Paul Pallud had visited there in 1984 in preparation of the
Crete feature in
After the Battle
No. 47). The river has now
become canalised, with tall trees and ten-foot-high cane on
either side of it, making a comparison more difficult. Mark
took this photo on the right of the river but feels that the
tank was probably some 50 yards away on the other side of
the river.
5
MARK WILSON
WILHELM WEIER

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