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THE BATTLE FOR CHERBOURG
Number 147
NUMBER 147
© Copyright
After the Battle
2010
Editor: Karel Margry
Editor-in-Chief: Winston G. Ramsey
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UTAH BEACH
CONTENTS
THE BATTLE FOR CHERBOURG
WRECK DISCOVERY
The Japanese Tanks of Bougainville
UNITED KINGDOM
The Women’s Land Army
IT HAPPENED HERE
The Case of Pilot Officer
John Benzie
2
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37
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Early on June 18, troops of US VII Corps, having advanced from Utah Beach since
D-Day, reached Barneville and Carteret on the west coast of the Cotentin, cutting the
peninsula in half. For the next ten days the Americans concentrated their operations
on a northward drive aimed at taking Cherbourg and its port. The VII Corps attacked
with three divisions abreast on June 19, encountering no opposition except on its
right wing where the 4th Division came up against organised resistance in the
Montebourg sector. Attacking with tank support on either side of the town, the 8th
and 12th Infantry Regiments finally broke the German defence and by nightfall the
8th Infantry was south and east of Valognes with the 12th Infantry on its right.
When plans were drawn up for the Allied
invasion of France, one important considera-
tion was that it would be necessary to secure
a deep-water port to allow reinforcements to
be brought in directly from the United
States. Cherbourg, at the tip of the Cotentin
peninsula in Normandy, was closest to the
landing beaches and the planners conse-
quently decided that the US First Army’s
main task should be ‘to capture Cherbourg
as quickly as possible’.
The US 82nd and 101st Airborne Divi-
sions spearheaded Operation ‘Overlord’ in
the west, landing at the base of the peninsula.
Their landings were scattered but they nev-
ertheless secured most of the routes by which
the American forces landing at Utah Beach
would advance. The US 4th Infantry Divi-
sion landed on Utah Beach shortly after
dawn with few casualties (see
D-Day Then
and Now).
For the first days, the priority was
to link up with the main Allied landings fur-
ther east. The flooded Douve valley was
crossed on June 9 and Carentan captured the
next day, giving the Allies a continuous front
at which point US VII Corps began to drive
westwards to cut off the peninsula at its base.
On June 9, concerned over the threat of an
enemy breakthrough to Cherbourg, the Ger-
man 7. Armee ordered the 77. Infanterie-
Division, then coming up from Brittany, to
proceed up the peninsula to Valognes. Two
days later, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von
Rundstedt, the German Commander-in-
Chief in the West, and Generalfeldmarschall
Erwin Rommel, the commander of Heeres-
gruppe B, met to discuss the serious situation
and agreed to report independently to Hitler.
Both reports gave the same appreciation of
the German situation in Normandy and of
the Allies’ intentions. Von Rundstedt
explained that ‘the formations of Heeres-
gruppe B fighting in Normandy are forced on
to the defensive between the Orne and the
Vire. Offensive operations cannot as yet be
conducted in this broad sector for lack of
forces and because the panzer divisions had
to be used for defence.’ In order to prevent a
breakthrough to Cherbourg, which was obvi-
ously the immediate American objective,
Front Cover:
Captain William H. Hooper of the 314th
Infantry Regiment, 79th Division, leading a group of
German POWs out of Cherbourg along Avenue de
Paris on June 28, 1944. Hooper would be killed two
weeks later near La Haye-du-Puits. (USNA)
Inset:
The same view today. This is the old toll entrance to
the city, known as L’Octroi, with Rue Armand Levéel
branching off to the right in the background (see
page 13). (Jean Paul Pallud)
Centre Pages:
The remains of German coastal Battery
‘Blankenese’ in the dunes near Néville, 25 kilometres
east of Cherbourg. Comprising four casemates for
94mm Flak guns and a fire-control bunker, it was
manned in June 1944 by the 2. Batterie of Marine-
Artillerie-Abteilung 260. (Jean Paul Pallud)
Back Cover:
We believe that this headstone to an
unknown pilot of the Second World War in
Brookwood Cemetery, Surrey, marks the last resting
place of Pilot Officer John Benzie. (ATB)
Acknowledgements:
Our story on the battle for
Cherbourg is taken from
Cross-Channel Attack
(Washington, 1951) by Gordon A. Harrison, a
volume of the official history of the US Army in
World War II, adapted and expanded with details
from German sources. The Editor would like to
thank the French Marine Nationale, particularly Vice
Amiral Philippe Périssé, Préfet Maritime at
Cherbourg, and the Direction des Constructions
Navales (DCNS), particularly M. Bruno Richebé,
Director Cherbourg, for allowing Jean Paul Pallud to
visit their installations. He also thanks Marie
Thérèse, Catherine, Jacques and Yannick Berton;
Comte and Comtesse Arnaud de Pontac; Roger
Delarocque and La Cité de la Mer. The Editor is
further indebted to Roy J. Turner for his generous
help with the feature on the Women’s Land Army.
Photo Credits:
AWM — Australian War Memorial,
Canberra; BA — Bundesarchiv; USNA — US National
Archives.
2
Above:
In the second half of June 1944, the US First Army
directed all its efforts towards the capture of Cherbourg as the
great Channel port was considered vital for the supply of the
American forces. Signal Corps photographer Sergeant Peter
J. Petrony pictured an M8 armoured car of the 801st Tank
Destroyer Battalion entering Montebourg during the north-
ward advance toward the port city.
Below:
The southern
entrance to Montebourg remains unchanged.
THE BATTLE FOR CHERBOURG
they proposed to counter-attack in the
Cotentin. Pointing out that the purpose of
this strike would be ‘to annihilate the enemy
there’, Rommel stressed that ‘only when this
has been accomplished can the enemy
between the Orne and the Vire be attacked’.
Refusing the field-marshals’ demand that
a counter-attack in the Cotentin was an
urgent need, Hitler’s reaction on June 12 was
to insist that ‘the enemy bridgehead between
the Orne and Vire must be attacked and
destroyed piece by piece’.
By Jean Paul Pallud
By June 14, it was clear that the Americans
were close to cutting the peninsula in half so
Rommel decided that two divisions (the 243.
3
ATB
USNA
USNA
Above:
The original plan for the drive on Cherbourg was for a two-division attack, by
the 4th and 90th Divisions, while the 9th Division took up a blocking position on the
west coast. However, on June 18, after consultation with Lieutenant General Omar
Bradley, the First Army commander (left), and some of his division commanders,
Major General J. Lawton Collins, the VII Corps commander (right), changed his plans
in favour of a stronger attack. In order to take maximum advantage of the German
disintegration, the idea was now to commit the corps’ full combat strength. A fresh
division, the 79th, would be deployed and three divisions — the 9th, 79th and 4th —
would drive northwards abreast while the 90th Division would take over the task of
blocking along the west coast. Here General Bradley listens to Collins (wearing gog-
gles and an M1911 pistol in a shoulder holster) describing how the Cherbourg battle
was fought — a picture taken later in June or early July.
and 709. Infanterie-Divisions) would be suf-
ficient for the defence of Cherbourg and that
the 77. Infanterie-Division should be moved
south to oppose the American push to the
south. Accordingly the 7. Armee issued
orders to divide the forces in the Cotentin
into two groups. Gruppe von Schlieben
(under Generalleutnant Karl-Wilhelm von
Schlieben, the commander of the 709. Infan-
terie-Division), consisting of his own division
and all the troops deployed on the Monte-
bourg line (save the 77. Infanterie-Division),
was charged with the defence of Cherbourg.
Meanwhile, Gruppe Hellmich (under
Generalleutnant Hans Hellmich, the com-
mander of the 243. Infanterie-Division), with
the 77. Infanterie-Division and all those
troops south and west of the Merderet river,
received the task of building a defensive line
near the base of the Cotentin, between the
marshlands west of Carentan and the penin-
sula’s west coast near Portbail.
However, the following day an order from
Hitler arrived which stipulated that the pre-
sent line must be ‘held at all cost’. Rommel,
who was at the LXXXIV. Armeekorps head-
quarters near Saint-Lô when the Führer
decree reached him, tried to make the best of
an impossible situation. He decided that the
77. Infanterie-Division should send some ele-
ments southwards while ostensibly holding
its ground. However, the 7. Armee soon for-
bade any move and orders given to the 77.
Infanterie-Division were countermanded. As
a consequence, nothing was accomplished
during the night of June 16/17, squandering
the last chance of rescuing the 77. Infanterie-
Division from the closing trap.
4
Following a demand from von Rundstedt
on June 15 that someone from the Oberkom-
mando der Wehrmacht (OKW, German
Armed Forces High Command) must come
to France to discuss the situation, Hitler
decided to come personally. A conference
was arranged at the ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ com-
plex of camouflaged bunkers at Margival,
north-east of Soissons (see
After the Battle
No. 19), on the morning of the 17th. Finding
fault with the local commanders, Hitler
expressed his dissatisfaction with their
attempts to counter the Allied landings. Von
Rundstedt and Rommel sought to obtain
freedom of action, including permission to
draw at will on reserves from coastal areas
not immediately threatened by invasion.
They also recommended certain withdrawals
in order to shorten their lines and concen-
trate their forces but Hitler refused all of
this. Instead, he ordered that fortress Cher-
bourg must be held at any cost as long as pos-
sible.
On June 17, the VII Corps continued its
advance westwards, the main effort being
made by the US 9th Division. Early on June
18, troops of its 60th Infantry entered
Barneville, cutting the coast road and thus
practically sealing off the base of the
Cotentin. During the night and the following
morning columns of Gruppe Hellmich tried
to force their way southwards. On the 19th,
elements of Grenadier-Regiment 1050 (of
the 77. Infanterie-Division) succeeded in tak-
ing a bridge over the Ollande river, capturing
more than 100 Americans, and permitting
some 1,400 men to slip through to the south.
This was one of the few German successes.
Many other columns were caught on the
road and destroyed, among them the remain-
der of the divisional artillery. Delay in mak-
ing vital decisions resulted in a disastrous
confusion that sacrificed the bulk of the 77.
Infanterie-Division for no gain. Among
those who failed to escape were Generalleut-
nant Hellmich, killed on June 17, and Gen-
eralmajor Rudolf Stegmann, the commander
of the 77. Infanterie-Division, fatally
wounded near Bricquebec during a fighter-
bomber attack the following afternoon.
Originally, VII Corps planned a two-divi-
sion drive on Cherbourg with the 90th Divi-
sion on the right and the 4th Division on the
left. However, the 90th had demonstrated
too many signs of unreadiness in the recent
fighting, and on June 13 its commander,
Brigadier General Jay W. MacKelvie was
relieved and replaced by Major General
Eugene M. Landrum. (Two regimental com-
manders, Colonel Philip H. Ginder of the
357th Infantry and Colonel James W.
Thompson of the 358th Infantry, were
relieved at the same time.) As a fresh divi-
sion — the 79th Infantry Division — was
available, the VII Corps commander, Major
General J. Lawton Collins, asked for and
received it as a replacement for the 90th.
On June 18, a new, stronger plan of attack
was developed by General Collins in consul-
tation with Lieutenant General Omar N.
Bradley, the commander of the US First
Army, and some of the division comman-
ders. The drive on Cherbourg would now be
carried out by three divisions abreast: the 4th
on the right, the 79th in the centre and the
9th on the left. The 4th Division was to
bypass the coastal defences in order to
advance as rapidly as possible with its right
flank protected by the 24th Cavalry
Squadron. The 4th Cavalry Squadron was to
be used to attack between the 9th and 79th
Divisions while the 90th Division was to take
over the role initially envisioned for the 9th
Division of blocking the west coast.
Through capture by the 9th Division of
field orders of the LXXXIV. Armeekorps
and the 77. Infanterie-Division, VII Corps
had a pretty accurate picture of the state of
German defences in the peninsula. General
Collins knew of the splitting of German
forces and of the order to General von
Schlieben to withdraw on the fortress Cher-
bourg. The last-minute attempt of the 77.
Infanterie-Division to pull south of the 9th
Division lines had been cut off, and it could
be assumed that disorganisation existed in
the western half of the German lines. By
attacking fast and hard VII Corps might
exploit the disorganisation as well as push
General von Schlieben’s planned withdrawal
into a rout. VII Corps Intelligence estimated
that the enemy would fight delaying actions
and would stand for a defence of Cherbourg
on the line of hills ringing it to a depth of
about five miles. Fixed defences in this posi-
tion had been reconnoitred and plotted accu-
rately long before D-Day. Although the
exact number of German troops at von
Schlieben’s disposal for the defence of Cher-
bourg could only be guessed at, it was known
that all his major combat units (the 709., 243.,
91. and 77. Infanterie-Divisions) existed only
in fragments. The total enemy force locked
in the peninsula was variously estimated at
between 25,000 and 40,000 including Flak
and naval personnel and Organisation Todt
workers.
The VII Corps attacked early on June 19.
On the left, the 9th Division (Major General
Manton S. Eddy) encountered no opposition
and easily reached its designated objectives.
In the centre, the 79th Division (Major Gen-
eral Ira T. Wyche) did the same on its left
wing although it experienced some difficul-
ties on its right south-west of Valognes. Only
the 4th Division (Major General Raymond
O. Barton) on the right wing came up against
organised resistance when the 8th and 12th
Infantry Regiments attacked side by side on
a north-west axis on either side of Monte-
bourg. However, tank support got the attack
moving and both regiments soon broke the
German line. By nightfall the 8th Infantry
was just south and east of Valognes with the
12th Infantry on its right. The 22nd Infantry
entered Montebourg at 6 p.m. and found the
town deserted.
The resistance in front of the 4th Division
on June 19 was actually little more than a
gesture by General von Schlieben at carrying
out his orders to fight his way slowly back to
fortress Cherbourg. The orders could
scarcely have been carried out. On his west
flank, von Schlieben had no positions to hold
and only disorganised troops who would
have been needlessly sacrificed if they had
attempted a stand. The plunge forward of the
9th and 79th Divisions during June 19 ren-
dered defence of the sector opposite the 4th
Division useless and dangerous. During the
night, therefore, von Schlieben ordered a
general disengagement on this front and
drew all his force back to the fortress ring
immediately defending Cherbourg.
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