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Volume 94 Number 888 Winter 2012
‘Organising
the
unpredictable’: the
Nigeria–Biafra war
and its impact on
the ICRC
Marie-Luce Desgrandchamps
Marie-Luce Desgrandchamps is a teaching assistant
in the Department of General History at the University
of Geneva. She is currently preparing a doctoral thesis on
humanitarian aid during the Biafra crisis (1967–1970).
Abstract
This article analyses how the events of the late 1960s
–
and in particular the
Nigeria–Biafra War
–
marked a turning point in the history of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Nigeria-Biafra conflict required the ICRC to
set up and coordinate a major relief operation during a civil war in a post-colonial
context, posing several new challenges for the organisation. This article shows how the
difficulties encountered during the conflict highlighted the need for the Geneva-based
organisation to reform the management of its operations, personnel, and
communications in order to become more effective and professional. Finally, the
article takes the examination of this process within the ICRC as a starting point for a
broader discussion of the changing face of the humanitarian sector in the late 1960s.
Keywords:
Nigeria, Biafra, ICRC, history, professionalisation, reform, assistance.
Published literature often presents the Nigeria–Biafra War (1967–1970) as marking
a
‘before
and after’ in the history of humanitarian aid.
1
Generally speaking, the
founding of Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders, MSF) after this
conflict has been put forward to justify this assertion, as has been the development
of its new methods, breaking with a more traditional humanitarianism represented
doi:10.1017/S1816383113000428
1409
M.-L. Desgrandchamps
– ‘Organising
the unpredictable’: the Nigeria–Biafra war and its impact on the
ICRC
by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The political activism of
these new humanitarian organisations, focused on speaking out and operating
without borders, was the driving force behind the emergence of a new generation
of humanitarian actors.
2
This interpretation is the key to understanding the
subsequent positioning of these new humanitarian actors, and especially of MSF
vis-à-vis the ICRC. However, the emphasis on this issue in the history of
humanitarianism, especially in the analysis of the Nigeria–Biafra conflict, has been
to the detriment of other developments of the time. This article aims at looking
beyond this narrow focus on speaking out in order to chart the larger-scale shift in
the humanitarian sector in the late 1960s. Among the factors that can shed new light
on the practices of emergency relief organisations at the time, particularly those of
the ICRC, are the increasing number of non-governmental organisations whose
involvement was no longer limited to fundraising but now also extended to
field
operations, growing media coverage of humanitarian crises, and the post-colonial
context in which aid operations were conducted.
3
For the ICRC, despite its experience in armed conflict, the Nigeria–Biafra
war was in many ways a relatively new response scenario.
4
Studies of this period in
the ICRC’s history are few and far between,
5
but the literature generally agrees on
the importance of this conflict.
6
Some go so far as to describe it as a turning point, as
one former ICRC delegate remarked:
The modern ICRC was born in Africa, in the smoking ruins of Biafra in the late
1960s. This is where the new ICRC was brought to the baptismal font of a new
humanitarian era, during the development of a huge rescue operation for
hundreds of thousands of victims of the Nigerian civil war.
7
This view of the conflict raises questions about its impact on the way in which the
ICRC functioned, especially since, as David Forsythe has explained, the organisation
1
For Philippe Ryfman, the second century of humanitarian action starts with Biafra: see Philippe Ryfman,
Une histoire de l’humanitaire,
La Découverte, Paris, 2008, pp. 48–49. Although Michael Barnett does not
repeat the same periodisation, he also indicates that Biafra opened a new chapter in humanitarian action:
see Michael Barnett,
Empire of Humanity: a History of Humanitarianism,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca,
2011, p. 133.
For a discussion of these questions, see P. Ryfman, above note 1, pp. 52–59.
On the shift in the activities of non-governmental actors to areas outside of Europe at the end of World
War II and the unprecedented media coverage of humanitarian crises from the late 1960s, see for example
M. Barnett, above note 1, pp. 118–158.
On the International Committee of the Red Cross and its principles of action, see François Bugnion,
The
International Committee of the Red Cross and the Protection of War Victims,
ICRC and Macmillan,
Geneva, 2003.
A well-documented study was done at the end of the conflict by an ICRC staff member who had access to
the archives: Thierry Hentsch,
Face au blocus: histoire de l’intervention du Comité international de la
Croix-Rouge dans le conflit du Nigéria, 1967–1970,
Droz, Geneva, 1973. See also the analysis by
Jacques Freymond, Committee member and vice-president during the conflict,
‘Nigéria–Biafra:
l’aide aux
victimes de la guerre civile’, in
Preuves,
first
quarter, 1970, pp. 70–83.
David P. Forsythe,
The Humanitarians: the International Committee of the Red Cross,
Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 62; Caroline Moorehead,
Dunant’s dream: War, Switzerland and the
History of the Red Cross,
Harper Collins, London, 1998, p. 614.
Jean-Marc Bornet,
Entre les lignes ennemies: délégué du CICR 1972–2003,
Georg Éditeur, Geneva, 2011,
p. 87.
2
3
4
5
6
7
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Volume 94 Number 888 Winter 2012
has generally been reluctant to accept change:
‘the
ICRC embraced change only
slowly, frequently when anticipated negative outcomes left little choice but to
change’.
8
A book on the ICRC covering the 1945–1980 period also concluded that
significant developments had taken place in the wake of the Biafra conflict, which
transformed the ICRC’s assistance policy.
9
This became increasingly oriented
towards areas outside Europe, particularly in Africa and South America, and gained
in magnitude. In addition, a jump in the ICRC’s budget and workforce occurred
during this period.
10
Finally, a restructuring got under way between 1970 and 1974,
when the organisation was taking stock of its Nigeria–Biafra operation.
11
To understand the impact of the Nigeria–Biafra conflict, it is necessary to
analyse the way in which it exposed the ICRC’s weaknesses and prompted a process
of reform. These weaknesses were particularly evident in three areas. First, the
functioning of the organisation itself and its ability to manage a large-scale
operation were called into question. Second, its interaction with other organisations
and individuals
–
governments, other humanitarian agencies, and the media
–
also
became subject to criticism. Third, the difficulties encountered by the ICRC in
recruiting and training qualified staff were part and parcel of a new challenge: how
to work more effectively in the
field.
In the face of these problems, the ICRC had to
demonstrate
flexibility
and take the initiative in order to conduct such a complex
operation.
The purpose of this article is therefore to understand how a series of
emergency measures, affecting the ICRC’s internal functioning and other aspects,
fit
into a wider reform process that profoundly re-shaped the ICRC in subsequent
years. More generally, an analysis of this process reveals how changes in the internal
structure of humanitarian organisations can be driven by action taken in the
field.
Even the relatively short time period covered here suffices to shed light not only on
the principles underpinning the action of such organisations but also on how they
function.
12
Operation Nigeria–Biafra: new challenges for the ICRC?
In the mid-1960s, the ICRC had not yet fully recovered from its difficulties at the
end of World War II, when the fall in its activities led to a drastic reduction in its
budget and workforce.
13
In addition, it had been heavily criticised for its failure to
8
9
10
11
12
13
D. P. Forsythe, above note 6, p. 51.
Jacques Freymond, George Willemin and Roger Heacock,
The International Committee of the Red Cross,
Martinus Nijhoff, Boston, 1984, p. 79.
Ibid.,
pp. 57–67 and 129.
Ibid.,
p. 128.
Pierre-Yves Saunier,
‘Le
secrétaire général, l’ambassadeur et le docteur: un conte en trois épisodes pour les
historiens du
“monde
des causes” à l’époque contemporaine’, in
Monde(s), Histoire, Espaces, Relations,
May 2012, p. 33.
Françoise Perret and François Bugnion,
De Budapest à Saigon: histoire du Comité international de la
Croix-Rouge, vol. IV, 1956–1965,
ICRC and Georg Éditeur, Geneva, 2009, p. 39. Catherine Rey-Schyrr,
De
Yalta à Dien Bien Phu: histoire du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, vol. III, 1945–1955,
ICRC and
Georg Éditeur, Geneva, 2007.
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M.-L. Desgrandchamps
– ‘Organising
the unpredictable’: the Nigeria–Biafra war and its impact on the
ICRC
help the victims of the Nazi genocide and prisoners from the Eastern Front.
Although the ICRC gradually managed to overcome these difficulties, the situation
in the mid-1960s remained precarious. Between 1945 and 1965, it did carry out
significant operations, but generally only ones requiring relatively limited resources.
Indeed, in those conflicts in which it was called on to act, the ICRC focused mainly
on its traditional tasks
–
that is to say, activities for detainees, whether prisoners of
war or civilian internees, and supporting National Red Cross Societies in cases of
disturbances. While the ICRC contributed to major relief operations for civilians,
this was not its primary focus and required significant resources. In this respect, the
operation that took place following the entry of Soviet troops into Hungary in 1956,
in which the ICRC distributed food to Hungarian refugees in Vienna, was a notable
case, accounting for a significant proportion of the aid distributed in the 1950–1960
period.
14
In several other cases, the ICRC mainly supported the work of National
Red Cross Societies. In the Cyprus and Algeria conflicts, for example, it was involved
in relief efforts for civilians alongside the British and French Red Cross Societies,
but did not have primary responsibility for those operations. Whenever it looked
like the ICRC would have to develop this type of activity, its policy was to try to
off-load the responsibility onto others. This was particularly the case in the Congo,
during the conflicts that erupted in the wake of independence in 1960. While
ICRC delegates took initiatives to protect and assist civilians, they were not really
supported by headquarters, which felt that the ICRC could not afford to get
involved and that this task was the responsibility of other organisations such as the
United Nations.
15
Overall, for the period up to the mid-1960s, Françoise Perret and
François Bugnion describe how
[t]he ICRC, which did not have the means to match its policies, was reduced to
matching its policies to its means. All too often, without adequate resources, it
had to trim its programmes or cut short an operation while victims were still
in need.
16
In the late 1960s, with more and more situations requiring the ICRC’s attention,
resources were stretched further. Alongside the Nigeria–Biafra operation, the ICRC
had to deal with the Vietnam, Arab–Israeli and Yemen conflicts, as well as with
Greek political prisoners. The end of the 1960s thus saw the ICRC stepping up its
activities and operating in a wider range of settings.
17
It was no longer present in just
Europe, the Middle East and Asia, but also in sub-Saharan Africa. Establishing the
ICRC in sub-Saharan Africa posed quite a challenge. When several African states
were declared independent in the early 1960s, the ICRC had to raise awareness of its
work, which hitherto had been relatively limited. The African populations that had
been victims of violence during colonisation were not initially considered by the
14
15
16
17
J. Freymond, G. Willemin and R. Heacock, above note 9, p. 85.
F. Perret and F. Bugnion, above note 13, p. 309.
Ibid.,
p. 601.
D. P. Forsythe, above note 6, pp. 62–78.
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Volume 94 Number 888 Winter 2012
ICRC to fall within its remit.
18
Thus its
first
real contact with sub-Saharan Africa
was during the Italo-Ethiopian War.
19
Moreover, it was often when situations
involved European victims that the ICRC took action. In 1960, when the ICRC
became involved in the Congo, protecting the black population was not its primary
concern at
first,
although some delegates took initiatives along those lines. ICRC
delegates were
first
dispatched to help the white settlers, at the request of the
Belgian and French Red Cross Societies, and ended up coordinating the
establishment of Red Cross medical teams in the country. During the troubles that
heralded or accompanied independence in Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and South Africa, the ICRC dealt relatively little with
the local population, about whom there were still very widespread prejudices at
the time.
20
Some at the ICRC, however, felt that the organisation should establish
activities in independent sub-Saharan Africa and raise the ICRC’s profile in that
part of the world. By appointing a delegate for Africa at the beginning of the
1960s,
21
the ICRC sought to improve its relationship with the newly independent
states and to develop its activities there. Despite these initiatives, the ICRC was
still not well known or experienced in the region when the Nigeria–Biafra War
started.
In the summer of 1967, following the Republic of Biafra’s proclamation of
independence, the Federation of Nigeria took up arms to stop the secession.
22
The
ICRC became involved in the war zone by offering its services to the belligerents.
The
first
step was to inquire after the fate of prisoners of war and to support the
activities of the local Red Cross by providing equipment and medical staff. At the
end of 1967, the ICRC also started relief operations for civilians affected by the war
on both sides of the front line. When famine took hold in Biafra in 1968, this
became the organisation’s main focus. The challenge was to feed a population of
several million people in complex circumstances. For the ICRC, the main stumbling
block was the difficulty of obtaining the consent of the belligerents to bring aid into
Biafra, which was blockaded by the Nigerian government. While the government
accepted the principle, it wanted control over what was delivered and how, in order
to assert its sovereignty over the breakaway province. Conversely, the Biafran
18 Irène Herrmann and Daniel Palmieri,
‘Humanitaire
et massacre: l’exemple du CICR (1904–1994)’, in
Jacques Sémelin, Claire Andrieu and Sarah Gensburger (dir.),
La résistance aux génocides: de la pluralité
des actes de sauvetage,
Presse de Sciences Po, Paris, 2008, p. 237.
19 For an examination of the ICRC’s role during the Italo-Ethiopian War, see Rainer Baudendistel,
Between
Bombs and Good Intentions: the Red Cross and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935–1936,
Berghahn, New York,
2006.
20 For an overview of the ICRC’s activities in Africa in the early 1960s, see F. Perret and F. Bugnion, above
note 13, pp. 259–329.
21 After the 1962 Gonard Mission, Georg Hoffmann was appointed regional delegate for Equatorial and
Sub-Equatorial Africa and in 1963 became the general delegate for Africa (except for Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, Libya and Egypt): see
ibid.,
pp. 266 and 319–329.
22 On the Nigeria–Biafra War, see, among others, Anthony H. M. Kirk-Greene,
Crisis and Conflict in
Nigeria: a Documentary Sourcebook,
Oxford University Press, London, 1971; John Stremlau,
The
International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977;
Jean-Louis Clergerie,
La crise du Biafra,
Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1994; Michael Gould,
The
Struggle for Modern Nigeria: The Biafran War,
1967–1970, I. B. Tauris, London, 2012.
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