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AI & Soc (2011) 26:371–375

DOI 10.1007/s00146-011-0320-z

OPEN FORUM

Technology and culture and possibly vigilance too

C. T. A. Schmidt

Received: 28 September 2008 / Accepted: 25 February 2011 / Published online: 24 March 2011

Springer-Verlag London Limited 2011

Abstract

Many have bowed before the recently acquired

powers of ‘new technologies’. However, in the shift from

tekhne to tekhnologia, it seems we have lost human values.

These values are communicative in nature as technological

progress has placed barriers like distance, web pages and

‘miscellaneous extras’ between individuals. Certain values,

like the interpersonal pleasures of rendering service, have

been lost as their domain of predilection has for many

become fully commercially oriented, dominated by the

cadence of proﬁtability. Though the popular cultures of the

artiﬁcial have surged forth to deliver us from the twentieth

century, they have enabled some very superﬂuous dream-

ing—Man has succumbed to the Godly role of simulating

himself and creating other beings. Communication is

replaced by machines, services are rendered via many

automated devices, procreation has entered the public

sphere, robots and entertainment agents educate our youth

and mesmerising screen-integrating ‘forms of intelligence’

even think for us. As such, this so-called culture threatens

the very values Man constructed in the nineteenth and

twentieth centuries to guide himself into the future. But

what if the phenomena mentioned just reﬂect our new

values? The author presents an investigation into this cul-

tural shift, its impact on human practices with regards the

mind and the body and evokes some pros and cons of

generally accepting the ‘Culture of the Artiﬁcial’.

Keywords

Artefacts

Difference

Epistemology

Diversity (human)

Identity

Relation

Personhood

Philosophy (analytical)

Transhumanism

C. T. A. Schmidt (&)

Le Mans University & ENSAM-ParisTech Angers,

Laval, France

e-mail: Colin.Schmidt@univ-lemans.fr

1 Introduction

When it comes to the production of artefacts, our envi-

ronment—rich with technical objects—turns us into arte-

facts; in the current context, our pathological obsession on

technological conformism may lead one to think of oneself

as an artefact (during an invited (2011) talk in French

entitled ‘‘La communication transhumaniste? Discerne-

ments et deﬁs’’ at the 1st Conference of the French Tran-

shumanistic Society, I gave examples of this logic which

actually stem from Schmidt

2005, 2006

and

2007).

This

may sound strange but people do indeed generally try to

remodel their daily lives, capabilities and appearances to

keep up with others around them, as just anyone may

notice. Question: Should biodiversity studies include the

redesigning of Man? Regardless of the way one decides to

answer here, it would seem obvious that man’s simulating

himself has become a culture, or even a religion. The sci-

entiﬁc references for new future situations do not often

directly portray this activity as being ritualised. My per-

sonal observation from over the last 15 years allows me to

conﬁrm this tendency about Man’s self-simulation. Cul-

tural variations on such activity do exist and are too

abundant to treat here.

The way I see things, the

artefactualisation

of the

human species may be considered part of the evolutionary

process. Some may not agree with this statement; for many,

the matter dealt with herein appears ideological or perhaps

irrelevant to down-to-earth daily concerns… for the time

being. I intend to explore the types of arguments put forth

on both sides of the equation in order to illustrate the

incomprehension that exists between the protagonists

responding from opposing viewpoints with regard to the

question of whether or not we should redesign the human

being, a fast growing issue.

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AI & Soc (2011) 26:371–375

More speciﬁcally, I will address issues involving

advanced Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Humanoid Robotics

and

Transhumanism without wishing to put forth a decision

why we should or should not accept new forms of life

similar to our present state or those that deviate from it.

This said, uprising nations should particularly be wary of

deviant grassroots industrial practices (such as organ

farming or operations that do not reﬂect the standards of

the Establishment), now and in the future. Since the nature

of body or personhood change is limited in some move-

ments to behavioural or physical aspects, the actual change

seems spectacular (i.e. a smart silicon implant) in com-

parison with changing one’s body through exercise. The

reader will not ﬁnd any statistics here, just facts and

principles about modiﬁcations aiming towards new cre-

ations (i.e. ethically impacted material such as female

feticide are left out as it does not constitute an improve-

ment on the being in question, but rather just an ‘existential

preference’.

2 Techniques for human modiﬁcation

What this means is that there are basically two approaches

to going about the artefactualisation of the human species.

In fact, the evolutionary process itself has changed and

possibly further diversiﬁcation of it may come about

especially if humans play a role in guiding evolution. The

current two approaches are separate in that their starting

points are not the same. On the one hand, the robotics-

based approach generally uses many components that are

mechanical in nature (traditional hardware) though there is

a growing tendency to accept organic elements into these

constructions. The reasons for using organic stuffs in the

robotics sphere of intervention in society are various: either

they are less costly, increase functionality, render the

resulting ‘machine’ more lifelike, less harmful to the

environment, or they provide jobs to the local workforce.

On the other hand, the transhumanist approach begins

rebuilding man with one single very familiar component,

the human body—just like yours or mine—assuming it is

fully natural. The idea is to use technological advances to

modify the body or brain in hopes of creating a desired

effect. This could entail introducing various entities into

the body for a variety of reasons: molecules (i.e. using

metabolic control for ‘slimming’, anti-ageing medicine to

stay young or live long), electronic chips (i.e. in the brain

to help one understand better or remember more, in the

eyes to improve sight, etc.), bionics for increased power, or

all other implants.

Perhaps a minor detail would be the difference between

implants

and

transplants.

The former generally take the

currently-used-to state of the individual to one she/he does

not know in order to experience it—picture the average

person having Steve Austin’s bionic ability to lift and

throw heavy objects!—whereas the latter aims at bringing

one back to a state she/he has always been used to but has

recently lost—an elderly person having a hip replacement.

The only similarity between the two is that they both

augment the person’s

present

state.

Let us get back to the robotics versus transhumanism

distinction. Although different, it is important to point out

that there are similarities: for both approaches, it is the

desired

effect that leads to the design of a new or even

novel

being, which means there is a certain wilfulness

driving towards a new world. I do not think this drive is

new; it is just the techniques used that may surprise people.

Change is a concept that the notion of Man has always

integrated, this is the reason we are part of the world’s

evolutionary cycle.

But it would seem that this short-term aspect of evolu-

tion is mainly behaviour based, thus there is limited change

to the identity of what it means to be human. The concept

of being human does entail a highly social element to it, as

well as a cultural one: it is not in individually modifying

the bodies of the members of society that one can change

the relationships they enjoy or detest. This said sustained

corporal change over time could well have an effect on

relations in society.

2.1 Difference and the concept of Man

The concept of Man would of course become different, but

to what extent? Perhaps the thing that society is calling out

for here is a concept of humans that is more material in

nature when compared to the current idea of what it is to be

human. The belief that we could/should/must modify our

very own physical existence may mean that the immate-

rial—social, psychological, cultural and spiritual—aspects

of our lives have become less important to us. Would such

a statement be too simplistic or is it part of our new reality?

Those working in advanced Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Cogni-

tive Robotics, Neuro-evolution, and transhumanistic-type

technologies generally do not delve into the intricate

questions of love, faith or the respect of the Other in

society, all of which directly concern the human immaterial

sphere. They are not supposed to be intimately concerned

with such matters, nor are other scientiﬁc ﬁelds. One could

nevertheless be very mistaken in saying that these matters

are not on scientists’ agendas (cf.

infra

my mention of the

advances towards this in 1. Presuppositions); how could

they ever hope to do better than man if they cannot even

copy these facettes of the human race? We could indeed

conclude for the time being that the concept of being

human today means being

more physically human

than

100 years ago.

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AI & Soc (2011) 26:371–375

373

2.2 Relation and the concept of Man

So the concept of Man has evolved. Does this operate on

the relations this concept has with other concepts in its

vicinity? The concepts of Nature and Artefact would be

pertinent to explore here. The fact that we today accept to

tamper

with mother nature’s ‘products’ is not new but the

acceptance to direct this action on our physical and cog-

nitive existences has increased exponentially. The place of

nature—highly recognised as essential—in traditional cul-

tures would have diminished. However, one is entitled to

disagree with strong statements, in which case it could only

be said that our relation to nature would have been altered

only slightly. The important matter is in asking why this

change suddenly became necessary and what our new

relation with nature, however, close it is to the last version,

means to us in the future.

As for the link to the concept of artefact, the shift does

seem more radical, although Man has always accepted to

handle his own destiny; hence the expression ‘he is a self-

made man’. The tie between Man and being man-made

has been strengthened in the consciousness of members of

society, perhaps paradoxically. A ‘self-made man’ always

referred to the self-assurance, aspirations, intellectual sta-

mina and other paraphernalia of the purely

psychological

composition

of the individual whereas now, we are able to

apply it to his

physical composition.

The imminence of the

merger between robotic products and the physically ori-

ented propositions of transhumanism can now be addres-

sed as more than just an eye-opening thought. If one

prefers lesser-alarming realities for measuring one’s con-

sciousness of the conceptual relation between men and

artefacts, one could examine the simple layman’s example

of the use of steroids: ﬁrst they were used practically

joyfully, then considered cheating, now they are amal-

gamated to deadliness—and this shift happened over a

relatively short period of time whilst the effects of their

use remained stable. Will our judgement on what can and

what cannot be considered an artefact be this rapidly

affected too?

2.3 Identity and the concept of Man

If the relations among the adjacent concepts in the system

are modiﬁed because of human modiﬁcation becoming

abundant, what does this bring forth for the identity of man

in the ecosystem? Imagine that we welcome this slide

toward the increased physical deﬁnition of Man: some

serious interrogations suddenly become visible. The fact

that man would have the opportunity to change the very

concept of himself in this manner, and that this would have

a real effect on his surroundings, proves that

homo sapiens

would control his own ‘conceptual environment’ and that

the techniques discussed here would be a mere side effect

of his existence (i.e. other techniques could be used to

sustain the developments sought). This would mean that

individuals really would have obtained an overwhelming

`-vis

their past and

vis-a

`-vis

their

level of power

vis-a

counterparts.

3 Shouldn’t we be against greater human diversity?

In the hypothetical system just described, the weaker are

bound to suffer more. Is this the type of

homo sapiens

wish to become?

The identity of others (and thus Selfhood too) would be

heavily affected in such a world. The identity of the Self

would be equated to a very heady position—practically

Godhood. But today, we do have the ‘magniﬁcent oppor-

tunity’ to actually

apply

this ill-formed logic to our lives

ourselves.

So should biodiversity include the redesign of man? As I

said, the key to strengthening the argument against modi-

fying Man has to put forth

practical

ideas on how and why

not to modify man in such an era—many are doing it

(eugenics, implants…), though perhaps not to the point of

becoming cyborgs. The undemocratic nature of such

practice is not stopping people because such an argument

remains quite ideological for most or at least irrelevant to

down-to-earth daily concerns.

The way in which they—the artiﬁcial or modiﬁed

beings—would seem (too) different from the average

human today is in the values they would, perceivably, be

able to share and apply. Because of the hypothetical dif-

ferences in the importance of (traditional) human values

and their application between original men and the non-

organic originating persons, one may not wish to see these

latter caring for one’s children or for the elderly. One may

have difﬁculty trusting the moral judgements of a non-

natural neighbour or artiﬁcial person. Imagine one’s mul-

tiply implanted neighbour is the judge in a widely mediated

homicide case; this could be a real media ‘scoop’, which

would help picture the situation here. The same would go

for our discovering the judge was a machine.

The practical measures necessary to supporting the view

that biodiversity should not include the redesign of Man

would entail, among other things, avoiding simulation in

all its forms. This measure on simulation could be pre-

sented as just general advice, negotiations for special cases

determined by a set of criteria, or out-right prohibition,

according to the adopted political stance. The important

aspect here is the urgency of the question as simulations are

changing our vision of ourselves and our world.

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AI & Soc (2011) 26:371–375

4 Some reasons for considering greater human

diversity

If we take up the judge example once again, the fact that a

human judge with silicon chip implants in the brain or a

purely robotic judge can be hooked up to all the sources of

jurisprudence possible in a continuous manner may one

day comfort the average citizen in the decision he/it makes.

It goes without saying that the sources the ‘judge’ has

access to will have to be limited to a select ofﬁcial set. If

accepted, this would be a very practical solution.

Those supporting the view that biodiversity

should

include redesigning humans have to develop strategies on

the ideological and political levels in order to seriously

further their cause, that of

artefactualising

humans,

because after all, Man would be an ‘artefactual object’ if he

was remodelled in the ways spoken of above. Furthermore,

our judge example is simply that: an example. One cannot

change society’s strategies on a political level based on a

mere practical example. Those that wish to promote the

vision of a widened biodiversity in which

homo sapiens

would be one of the species involved would have to either

directly modify the moral position of humans in the world

equilibrium (difﬁcult?) or show the strategic advantages to

becoming robotic individuals (acceptable?), transhuman or

posthuman (meaningless?). This may help people re-

examine their traditional stances. It may help here if I make

things explicit; the judge example would be a very prac-

tical solution, if accepted

by all or by the majority, as long

as average citizens are consulted.

Looking at the transhumanist movement will reveal that

the values put forth, whether one sees them to be accept-

able or not, are done so within the framework of speciﬁc

basic conditions according to Bostrom (2005), of Oxford

University: ‘Global Security, Technological Progress,

Wide Access’.

Any sensible being shares these conditions

and would like to have them protected, so the movement is

not so off-tilt as some might say it to be. Have we not

collectively been tampering with nature for a long time

already? Man has always had the tendency to ‘diversify’ in

one way or another, more on moral grounds than on

physical ones.

Accepting to go along with such change would be a

strategic move if it were to be used to unite people, com-

munities, etc. Allowing only weaker members of society to

better themselves would enable them to gain back their

dignity. But would creating laws prohibiting naturally

endowed persons access to changes be unfair? It is clear

Bostrom’s article culminates in a ‘‘Table of Transhumanist

Values’’,

cf.

Bostrom (2005), ‘‘Transhumanist Values’’,

Journal of

Philosophical Research,

Special Supplement on ‘Ethical Issues for

the Twenty-First Century’, p. 13.

that if the biodiversity of man is to be accepted by the

average citizen, any sensible discourse on the matter would

have use the legal/moral or non-physical level as its

cornerstone.

When one considers the argumentation necessary to

change things, it is tempting to just say that the physical

aspects of human life are quite malleable in comparison

with its non-manifest ‘components’. But Bostrom gives us

an indication of the little our

considering

transforming

human beings entails and where to look for inspiration to

change mindsets. In his own words,

he mentions that the

necessary ideals are found outside of our

bios.

We must

therefore act on our

logos

to better fathom the advent of

change. It is only if we focus on human reason that we will

be able to accept our own redesign.

5 Dialogue for dealing with the cultural shift

towards the artiﬁcial

The reader may ﬁnd that I fail to correctly transcend the

practical aspects of modifying man to develop sound

arguments on the ideological and political levels of why to

expand human diversity. However, pulling one way or

another was not the goal here. The current discussion in

this area of thought reminds me of Ricœur’s (Changeux

and Ricœur

1998)

stance on the impossible adjustment

between our ﬁnite body and our reason being inﬁnitely

open. Although the two levels of discourse are comple-

mentary to one another, their refusal to blend is what leads

to our mistakes, our miscalculations, etc. and renders the

whole process of decision-making fallible. This partially

because we ﬁnd ourselves before dilemmas such as the one

in this question: should the ‘ideal’ humanoid have all the

weakness man has? Do people need to be more machine-

like?

Today it is clear that a certain number of values are

perceived by at least some people as lost. According to

Mukherjee (2007) of the Centre for Human Values at the

Indian Institute of Management

in Calcutta, the distinction

between necessity and luxury has been greatly blurred by

the effects of globalisation. He states that ‘human con-

sciousness is spellbound at the marvels of modern tech-

nology […]. Caught as if in a trance, in the maze of

‘‘The realm of posthuman values does not entail that we should

forego our current values. The posthuman values can be our current

values, albeit ones that we have not yet clearly comprehended.

Transhumanism does not require us to say that we should favour

posthuman beings or human beings, but that the right of way of

favouring human beings is by enabling us to realise our ideals better

and that some of our ideals may well be located outside the space of

modes of being that are accessible to us with our current biological

constitution’’.

Cf.

OSTROM

N.,

ibidem,

p. 8.

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AI & Soc (2011) 26:371–375

375

Droit R-P (2005) ‘‘Dialoguer avec tous, et d’abord avec soi’’, dossier

‘Disparition: Paul Ricœur, Philosophe de tous les dialogues’, Le

Monde, 22–23 mai [Paul Ricœur died on the 20th of May]

Esquith S (2005) Technology and democratic political education:

simulation vs. re-enactment, Society for Philosophy and Tech-

nology, The American Philosophical Association, Central Divi-

sion Meeting, 27–30 April 2005 Chicago, Illinois

Jacques F (1979) Dialogiques, Recherches logiques sur le dialogue.

PUF, Paris

Mukherjee S (2007) Dialogues from the Land of Love and Death,

AI and Society, No. 21, pp 121–140

Quine WVO (1960) Word and object. The MIT Press, Cambridge

Schmidt CTA (2005) Of robots and believing, minds and machines.

Journal for artiﬁcial intelligence. Philosophy and Cognitive

Science, Kluwer

Schmidt CTA (2007) Redesigning man?. In: Vermaas PE, Kroes P,

Light A, Moore SA (eds) Philosophy and design: from

engineering to architecture, Springer Science, Dordrecht,

pp 199–206 [an alternate account and goal of the research

examined herein]

Schmidt CTA (2007) Future human intellect. speculations on the

nature of knowledge transfer, ‘Keynote Address’ international

conference entitled human being in contemporary philosophical

conceptions, laboratory for philosophical anthropology research,

faculty of philosophy and social technologies, Volgograd State

University, Russia, May 28–31

Schmidt CTA, Kraemer F (2006) Robots, Dennett and THE

Autonomous. A terminological investigation, minds and

machines. Journal for Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Philosophy and

Cognitive Science, Vol. 20 No. 1, Kluwer/Springer

Turing A (1950) Computing machinery and intelligence, Mind, vol

LIX No. 236

Warwick A (2004) I, Cyborg, University of Illinois Press

ceaseless activity at an alarming pace, hardly do we feel the

need or urgency to reﬂect on such deeper questions as

the purpose of life and the meaning of our actions.’

The

‘religion’ of simulating or modifying oneself will be the

inspiration of a grassroots industry, if it is not already. I do

hope to have provided elements essential to engaging

dialogue on the higher-order matters herein addressed;

taking action in the future depends on the knowledge we

are able to create through dialogue. Grassroots industry

based on a religion of simulating or modifying oneself

obviously entails that one transcends the opposing stand-

points presented here: either being for or against modiﬁ-

cations to elements that do not originate in the initial

material used, for example, injecting human entities into

the machine or injecting mechanistic entities into the

human body (cf. the writings of Warwick

2004).

New

forms of organisations need to be driven by vigilance either

to protect the unchanged or to accompany the being,

whatever he, she or it is through the modiﬁcations.

References

Bostrom N (2005) Transhumanist Values, Journal of Philosophical

Research, Special Supplement on ‘Ethical Issues for the Twenty-

First Century’, Charlottesville VA: The Philosophy Documen-

tation Centre

Changeux J-P, Ricœur P (1998) La nature et le regle. Ce qui nous fait

penser. Odile Jacob, Paris

Cf. M

UKHERJEE

S. (2007), ‘‘Dialogues from the Land of Love and

Death’’,

AI & Society,

n° 21, p. 122.

123

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